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Universities that own patents have a problem. While nearly 
all are keen to enhance their revenue generated from patents, few 
are eager or prepared to enforce them in court, alone or with their 
exclusive licensees, should a third party deploy a product or 
process covered by a university-owned patent. Yet strict prudential 
standing requirements imposed by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”) effectively require 
university participation as plaintiffs in enforcement lawsuits over 
their exclusively licensed patents, regardless of a university’s 
effective ability or enthusiasm to participate in a given action. 
Supported by forty years of lawsuit data and original survey and 
interview data collected from high-level administrators at 
universities that litigate patents, this Article explores in depth the 
complicated legal and policy tensions presented by university 
participation as plaintiffs in patent infringement litigation.  
 I offer two proposals for alleviating these tensions. The 
first proposal urges universities to move toward a coherent 
position on patent ownership and enforcement, particularly in light 
of recent trends in higher education finance. The second proposal 
outlines a potential legislative amendment to the Patent Act that 
would allow universities to enjoy the revenue-generation aspect of 
patent ownership while freeing them from the legal compulsion to 
participate as co-plaintiffs with their exclusive licensees in 
enforcement actions. This novel tweaking of the CAFC’s 
prudential standing requirement would save universities untold 
time and money that they currently spend pursuing litigation. By 
permitting universities to focus more on innovation and less on 
litigation, this proposal also would better align societal 
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Universities that own patents have a problem. While nearly 
all are keen to enhance their patent licensing activity and revenue 
generated from patents, few are willing or prepared to enforce 
them in court, alone or with their exclusive licensees, should a 
third party deploy a product or process covered by a university-
owned patent. Yet strict prudential standing requirements imposed 
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(“CAFC”) effectively require university participation as plaintiffs 
in enforcement lawsuits over their exclusively licensed patents, 
regardless of a university’s effective ability or enthusiasm to 
participate in a given action.  
Supported by forty years of lawsuit data and original 
survey and interview data collected from high-level administrators 
at universities that litigate patents, this article explores in depth the 
complicated legal and policy tensions presented by university 
participation as plaintiffs in patent infringement litigation. On the 
one hand, universities understandably are hesitant to take assertive 
postures in patent enforcement actions—given the financial and 
reputational costs such activity often entails—yet prevailing law 
conspicuously fails to account for this hesitancy. On the other 
hand, a patent is a government-granted right to sue, and 
universities’ reluctance to enforce their patents when warranted 
risks disrupting incentives inherent in the technology transfer 
system into which billions of federal research dollars are poured 
annually.  
The attendant policy quandaries for university 
commercialization activities are many. How much involvement in 
enforcement activity are universities willing to bear? How much 
involvement in enforcement activity should a society intent on 
encouraging university research and innovation want universities 
to bear? The empirically supported answers to the first set of 
questions (i.e., not much) are poles apart from what the patent law 
requires of universities concerning enforcement activity (i.e., 
involvement as named plaintiffs in most instances). Meanwhile, 
normative responses to the second question are potentially varied, 
further challenging patent law’s capacity to reflect and encourage 
policies that further innovation.  
A few guiding words on what follows. Part I introduces the 
relevant legal and policy tensions by first reviewing the judicial 
development of a prudential standing requirement for owners of 
exclusively licensed patents. I argue that the judicial rationale for 
this restrictive standing requirement is poorly suited to university 
patent owners, who suffer from the misfit. Part I then reviews legal 
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data and information on the historical involvement of universities 
as plaintiffs in patent infringement actions, and includes a 
discussion of the activity’s unique consequences for universities.  
Part II presents results from an original study conducted in 
2011 of high-level administrators at universities that litigate 
patents.
1
 Drawing on survey and interview data, this Part 
summarizes key findings as they relate to institutional policies and 
beliefs concerning the enforcement of patents through 
infringement litigation. Part II concludes with empirically based 
descriptions of the two major university approaches to patent 
infringement litigation. This schema—which describes most 
universities as somewhat erratic in their approaches to patent 
infringement litigation—provides footing for the policy and legal 
proposals advanced in Parts III and IV. 
Part III advances the broad policy proposal that universities 
should move toward a coherent position concerning their 
ownership and enforcement of patents. In addition to articulating 
the adverse consequences of the current ad hoc approach toward 
enforcement followed by most universities, this Part discusses the 
imperative for universities to reframe their understanding of 
patents, as well as how their development of appropriate decisional 
infrastructures concerning patent enforcement could lead to 
improvements in their enforcement behaviors.  
Finally, Part IV proposes a legislative amendment to the 
Patent Act that would allow universities to enjoy a principal upside 
of patent ownership (i.e., revenue generation), while also enjoying 
enhanced freedom to decline formal involvement in one of the 
biggest downsides to patent ownership (i.e., occasional 
involvement with exclusive licensees in enforcement actions). This 
novel tweaking of the patent enforcement paradigm would save 
universities untold time and money that they currently spend 
pursuing litigation. By permitting universities to focus more on 
innovation and less on litigation, this proposal would also better 
align societal expectations for university commercialization efforts 
with the public interest. 
  
                                                 
1
 This study was undertaken for my Ph.D. dissertation. See Jacob H. Rooksby, 
Universities That Litigate Patents (May 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Virginia) (on file with author). This Article is the first publication 
of the study’s findings. Portions of the Article are adapted from the dissertation. 
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I. UNIVERSITY PARTICIPATION AS PLAINTIFFS IN PATENT 
INFRINGEMENT LAWSUITS 
A. CAFC Case Law Affecting University Participation 
1. Legal Push or Market Pull? 
Patent infringement litigation is notoriously complex and 
expensive.
2
 Involvement in such litigation can cost universities 
hundreds of thousands of dollars or more,
3
 and is in some cases 
correlated with a quantifiable decrease in the number of licensing 
deals they enter into with industry.
4
 University involvement as 
plaintiffs in patent infringement lawsuits also has the potential to 
alienate donors, upset politicians with ties to defendants, and 
potentially cause universities to be seen as undermining their 
public-service values.
5
 In light of these potential concerns, one 
might reasonably ask: What motivates universities to litigate their 
patents? This seemingly simple question has a multitude of 
potential answers. Universities might litigate to protect their 
investments in patents, to support commercialization efforts by 
                                                 
2
 See Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The New Complex 
Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 
297 (2010) (discussing new litigation complexities and increased costs in the 
patent ecosystem). 
3
 A 2010 survey of U.S. law firms that specialize in intellectual property found 
that for patent infringement lawsuits with less than $1 million at risk, the mean 
cost for one party to take a case through the end of the pre-trial period was 
$490,000; further, the total mean cost for one party to take its case through trial 
and any appeal was $916,000. AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
ASSOCIATION, LAW PRACTICE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE 
ECONOMIC SURVEY I-153 (2011) [hereinafter AIPLA]. For lawsuits with $1 
million to $25 million at risk, the mean costs rose to $1,633,000 and $2,769,000, 
respectively. Id. at I-154. For lawsuits with over $25 million at risk, the mean 
costs were $3,553,000 and $6,018,000, respectively. Id. 
4
 Scott Shane & Deepak Somaya, The Effects of Patent Litigation on University 
Licensing Efforts, 63 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 739 (2007) (reporting statistically 
significant decrease in the number of new patent licenses executed by 
universities in years following involvement in patent litigation). 
5
 See generally James J. Duderstadt, Delicate Balance: Market Forces Versus 
the Public Interest, in BUYING IN OR SELLING OUT? THE COMMERCIALIZATION 
OF THE AMERICAN RESEARCH UNIVERSITY 56-74 (Ronald G. Stein ed., 2004) 
(noting the tension between universities’ historic commitment to the public good 
and their growing embrace of market values and practices with patents); Mark 
A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA 
& ENT. L.J. 611, 615-18 (2008) (noting industry sentiment that universities seem 
greedy when it comes to patents, in part because of their emergent interest in 
enforcing patents through infringement litigation). 
7
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their licensees, or even—perhaps controversially—to generate 
revenue. 
While Part II of this Article empirically explores these and 
other potential answers, perhaps the more important antecedent 
question is a narrower, legal one: Must universities that own 
patents litigate them? As with nearly every challenging legal 
question, the answer is, “It depends.” In this instance, it depends 
on what the university has done with the patent in question. If the 
university has not licensed the patent, the university alone can 
determine whether to bring an infringement lawsuit, and could 
very well decide never to sue.
6
  
But most university-owned patents are licensed patents. 
One of the primary goals of universities seeking patents is to 
commercialize inventions that their patents describe through 
negotiating advantageous agreements with industry. For 
universities with licensed patents, the answer to the question, 
“Must universities that own patents litigate them?” is complicated. 
In these instances, in fact, the decision whether to participate as a 
plaintiff in a patent infringement action does not rest with the 
university alone, assuming the patent has been licensed 
exclusively.
7
 A university can be bound both by private law—
through contract with its exclusive licensee—and by public law—




Presumably society should not care if a university contracts 
to participate as a plaintiff with its licensee in any infringement 
lawsuit and then is ordered by a court to uphold the contract by 
participating in such an action. Freedom of contracting is generally 
regarded as good for industry and competition, and university 
technology transfer offices (“TTOs”) have demonstrated their 
ability to enter into all varieties of arms-length agreements without 
external intervention.  
                                                 
6
 As further described in this Section, many universities that own unlicensed 
patents choose to litigate them. The reasons can vary. Perhaps a would-be 
licensee refuses to take a license to the patent, but decides to use technology 
covered by the patent. Or perhaps the university decides to deploy an assertion 
licensing strategy—sue first, license later—for fear of triggering a declaratory 
judgment action brought by the would-be licensee (potentially in an unfavorable 
jurisdiction) if the university sends it a letter suggesting that it might want to 
license one of the university’s patent.  
7
 For patents licensed non-exclusively, only the university has standing to sue 
for infringement. See Sicom Sys. Ltd., v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 427 F.3d 971, 976 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (“A nonexclusive license confers no constitutional standing on 
the licensee to bring suit or even to join a suit with the patentee because a 
nonexclusive licensee suffers no legal injury from infringement.”). 
8
 See Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law As Public Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
41 (2012) (describing the public ramifications of private rights granted through 
patents). 
8
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But what if a university does not contract to participate in 
any infringement lawsuit brought by its exclusive licensee, and yet 
is still required by law to participate? One might perceive little 
societal justification for forcing universities to litigate their patents, 
given the innovative research activities they are much better suited 
and expected to undertake. Yet in fact, universities have far less 
flexibility in this situation than one might expect. The explanation 
for this incongruity involves restrictive judicial imposition of 
standing rules in patent infringement cases. 
2. Patent Licenses, Patent Assignments, and the “All 
Substantial Rights” Inquiry  
Determining who has standing to sue for infringement of a 
patent, and which parties must participate in any such action, 
requires identifying the patentee and discerning which rights the 
patentee and others may have in the asserted patent, whether by 
license or by assignment.
9
 “Patentee” is simply the legal word for 
patent owner, although the Patent Act rather circularly defines it as 
“includ[ing] not only the patentee to whom the patent was issued 
but also the successors in title to the patentee.”
10
 According to the 
Patent Act, a “patentee shall have remedy by civil action for 
infringement of his patent.”
11
  
The U.S. Supreme Court has issued two decisions, both of 
which substantially predate the current Patent Act, that provide the 
framework by which the CAFC has interpreted and developed a 
prudential standing requirement in lawsuits involving allegations 
of patent infringement. In an 1891 case, Waterman v. Mackenzie,
12
 
the Court determined that if a patent owner licenses his patent,  
 
the title remains in the owner of the patent; 
and suit must be brought in his name, and 
never in the name of the licensee alone, 
unless that is necessary to prevent an 
absolute failure of justice, as where the 
patentee is the infringer, and cannot sue 
himself. Any rights of the licensee must be 
enforced through or in the name of the 
owner of the patent, and perhaps, if 
                                                 
9
 See Timothy Denny Greene, “All Substantial Rights”: Toward Sensible Patent 
Licensee Standing, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 1 (2012) (calling this inquiry “easy to 
state, but difficult to apply”). 
10
 35 U.S.C. § 100(d) (2006). 
11
 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2006). 
12
 138 U.S. 252 (1891). 
9
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necessary to protect the rights of all parties, 




Over thirty years later, the Court had occasion to further 
expound on competing interests in patent rights in Independent 
Wireless Telephone Company v. Radio Corporation of America.
14
 
In that case, the Court explained its creation of a prudential 
standing requirement that exclusive licensees may not sue for 
infringement without joining the patent owner. It reasoned that 
 
[t]he presence of the owner of the patent as a 
party is indispensable not only to give 
jurisdiction under the patent laws but also, in 
most cases, to enable the alleged infringer to 
respond in one action to all claims of 
infringement for his act, and thus either to 
defeat all claims in the one action, or by 





The CAFC further interpreted this prudential standing 
requirement in a line of cases dating back to 1991. The relevant 
inquiry typically concerns whether a given agreement is an 
assignment of all substantial rights to a patent, or is instead an 
exclusive license to less than all substantial rights to the patent.
16
 
In the first such case, Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica 
Euro Italia S.P.A., the defendant alleged in the district court that 
plaintiffs were merely licensees of the patent in suit, and as such, 
did not have standing to bring an infringement action without 
joinder of the party to whom the patent in suit originally issued.
17
 
The district court concluded that plaintiffs were assignees of the 
patent in suit, not licensees, and accordingly joinder of the party to 
whom the patent in suit originally issued was not required. The 
                                                 
13
 Id. at 255. 
14
 269 U.S. 459 (1926). 
15
 Id. at 468. The Court noted one exception to this rule: “If the owner of a 
patent, being within the jurisdiction, refuses or is unable to join an exclusive 
licensee as coplaintiff, the licensee may make him a party defendant by process, 
and he will be lined up by the court in the party character which he should 
assume.” Id. Before this exception can be applied, however, the patentee must 
be given the opportunity to join the infringement action.  
16
 This Section reviews arguably the three most important of these cases. For a 
more comprehensive review of relevant cases, see Greene, supra note 9; and 
Jeffrey L. Newton, Assuring All Substantial Rights in Exclusive Patent Licenses, 
44 LES NOUVELLES 235 (2009).  
17
 Vaupel Textilmaschinen v. Meccanica Euro Italia, 944 F.2d 870, 873 (Fed. 
Cir. 1991). 
10
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CAFC upheld this finding. Citing Waterman, the CAFC observed 
that “To determine whether a provision in an agreement constitutes 
an assignment or a license, one must ascertain the intention of the 
parties and examine the substance of what was granted.”
18
 In so 
doing, the CAFC noted an edict from the Waterman case: that 
“‘[w]hether a transfer of a particular right or interest under a patent 
is an assignment or a license does not depend upon the name by 
which it calls itself, but upon the legal effect of its provisions.’”
19
 
That is to say, calling an agreement a license or an assignment 
does not make it one. The actual substance of the rights conveyed 
is determinative. “All substantial rights” to the patent must be 




In reviewing various contracts between plaintiffs and the 
patentee to whom the patent originally issued, the Vaupel court 
noted that the latter maintained the following rights: (1) a veto 
right on any sublicensing by plaintiffs; (2) the right to seek patent 
protection on the subject invention in countries outside the United 
States; (3) a reversionary right to the patent in suit in the event 
plaintiffs filed for bankruptcy protection or terminated production 
of the product covered by the patent; and (4) the right to receive a 
portion of any damages returned in an infringement lawsuit 
brought by plaintiffs.
21
 In reviewing these retained rights, the 
CAFC concluded that none “was so substantial as to reduce the 




The Vaupel court also inspected those rights that plaintiffs 
obtained in the transfer. Notably, they received the right to sue for 
any past, present, or future infringements of the patent, subject 
only to the obligation to inform the original patentee of any lawsuit 
they brought. The CAFC deemed the conveyed right to sue for 
infringement “particularly dispositive.”
23
 It reached this conclusion 
by explaining the policy concern of a legal regime in which a 
patent owner could decline to join its exclusive licensee in an 
infringement action: in such a world, a single infringer unfairly 
would be susceptible to two suits alleging infringement of the same 
patent—precisely the prudential standing concern raised by the 
Supreme Court in Independent Wireless.
24
 Such would not be the 
                                                 
18
 Id. at 874. 
19
 Id. at 875 (quoting Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 256 (1891)). 
20
 Id. at 874. 
21
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risk, the CAFC determined, based on the rights assigned between 
the parties in Vaupel.
25
 
The CAFC further applied the tenets of the Vaupel decision 
in a case it decided in 1995, Abbott Laboratories v. Diamedix 
Corporation.
26
 The dispute involved an attempt by Diamedix, as 
original patentee of the patents in suit, to intervene as a party 
plaintiff in an infringement lawsuit brought by its exclusive 
licensee Abbott against Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc. The district 
court denied Diamedix’s motion to intervene, despite the 
defendant’s support of the motion.
27
 The CAFC reversed. 
Examining the relevant documents between the parties, the 
CAFC determined that Abbot was a licensee, not an assignee, of 
the patents in suit—i.e., that less than “all substantial rights” to the 
patents in suit had been transferred. Of particular relevance to the 
court in making this determination were the facts that “Diamedix 
retained a limited right to make, use, and sell products embodying 
the patented inventions, a right to bring suit on the patents if 
Abbott declined to do so, and the right to prevent Abbott from 
assigning its rights under the license to any party other than a 
successor in business.”
28
 While Abbott enjoyed the right to bring 
an infringement action under its agreement with Diamedix, the 
court noted that, “it does not enjoy the right to indulge 
infringements, which normally accompanies a complete 
conveyance of the right to sue.”
29
 Thus, in order not to expose the 
defendant to “the risk of multiple litigation or obligations,”
30
 and 
so as not to prejudice Diamedix’s interest in its ownership of the 
patents in suit, the court remanded the case for joinder of Diamedix 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a) as a required party.
31
 
In a subsequent case, Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc.,
32
 the 
CAFC made clear that simply retaining the right to sue for 
infringement does not automatically mean that “all substantial 
                                                 
25
 The court noted this outcome was consistent with Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 19(a), which concerns joinder. Complete relief could be accorded 
among those already parties to the case, and there was no risk of a party 
incurring double obligations. Id. at 876.  
26
 47 F.3d 1128 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
27
 Id. at 1130. Diamedix moved to intervene as a matter of right under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) or, in the alternative, under FED. R. CIV. P. 
24(b), which permits courts to allow permissive interventions. The defendant 
noted that Diamedix may have been an indispensable party under FED. R. CIV. P. 
19. Id. 
28




 Id. at 1133. 
31
 FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a). 
32
 211 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (finding all substantial rights had been 
transferred and that plaintiff had standing to sue without addition of original 
patentees as co-plaintiffs). 
12
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rights” to a patent have not been transferred.
33
 The case involved a 
purported transfer of patent rights between the original patentees 
and the ultima te plaintiff (Speedplay) in an infringement lawsuit. 
The original patentees retained the right to initiate an infringement 
action in their own names if Speedplay declined to do so. 
Distinguishing the facts in Abbott, the court determined that the 
original patentees’ retained right was “illusory, because Speedplay 
can render that right nugatory by granting the alleged infringer a 
royalty-free sublicense.”
34
 In Abbott, by comparison, the original 
patentee was entitled to receive royalty payments on any 
sublicense granted by the licensee.
35
 Thus, while “the nature and 
scope of the licensor’s retained right to sue accused infringers is 
the most important factor in determining whether an exclusive 
license transfers sufficient rights to render the licensee the owner 
of the patent,”
36
 Speedplay suggests that a retained right to sue 
does not automatically mean that less than “all substantial rights” 
to the patent have been conveyed.  
3. Asymmetric Results 
The CAFC’s decisions in Vaupel, Abbott, and Speedplay, 
as well as several subsequent cases,
37
 provide the underpinning for 
                                                 
33
 Id. at 1251. 
34
 Id.  
35
 Additionally relevant were the facts that the original patent owners in 
Speedplay did not enjoy the right to practice the patent or the right to participate 
in any infringement action brought by Speedplay (nor could they help manage 
any such action). Id.   
36
 Alfred E. Mann Found. for Sci. Research v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d 1354, 
1361 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that the plaintiff’s exclusive license transferred 
to licensee substantially less than the complete right to sue, that the plaintiff’s 
retained right to sue was significant, and that the license agreement was 
therefore not a virtual assignment). 
37
 See, e.g., Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Miracle Optics, Inc., 434 F.3d 1336, 1344 
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (“For the same policy reasons that a patentee must be joined in 
any lawsuit involving his or her patent, there must be joinder of any exclusive 
licensee.”); Sicom Sys. Ltd., v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 427 F.3d 971, 979 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005) (finding all substantial rights had not been transferred where licensee 
could not “indulge infringers outside of the ‘commercial’ sphere,” i.e., where 
licensor retained right to sue noncommercial infringers); Intellectual Prop. Dev., 
Inc. v. TCI Cablevision of Cal., Inc., 248 F.3d 1333, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“As 
a prudential principle, an exclusive licensee having fewer than all substantial 
patent rights possesses standing under the Patent Act as long as it sues in the 
name of, and jointly with, the patent owner and meets [Article III standing] 
requirements.”); State Contracting & Eng’g Corp. v. Condotte Amer., Inc., 346 
F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding all substantial rights had been transferred, 
even though contract conveyed right to sue for “past and present”—but did not 
mention future—infringements); Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. A-Roo Co., 222 F.3d 
1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“As a general rule, this court continues to adhere to 
the principle set forth in Independent Wireless that a patentee should be joined, 
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its decision in AsymmetRx, Inc. v. Biocare Medical, L.L.C.,
38
 the 
only CAFC decision to date involving the prudential standing 
requirement as applied to a university patent owner. There the 
CAFC vacated and remanded a lower court’s award of summary 
judgment to a defendant in a patent infringement lawsuit because 
the original patentee of the patents in suit (Harvard University) was 
not included as a plaintiff in the action. AsymmetRx, Inc., 
Harvard’s exclusive licensee, brought an action for patent 
infringement against Biocare Medical, LLC, which Harvard had 
previously granted a commercial license to use certain antibodies 
later the subject of patents licensed to AsymmetRx. Under its 
license to the patents in suit with Harvard, AsymmetRx was to 
“give careful consideration to the views of Harvard and to potential 
effects on the public interest in making its decision whether or not 
to sue” for patent infringement.
39
 Harvard retained the right to join 
any infringement action commenced by AsymmetRx and to jointly 
control any such action it joined.
40
 Whether it elected to join or 
not, AsymmetRx could not enter into a settlement without 
Harvard’s prior written consent.
41
 If AsymmetRx elected not to 




The parties on appeal focused their arguments on the 
district court’s finding of non-infringement by Biocare. The 
CAFC, however, raised what it called the “antecedent question: 
whether AsymmetRx had the statutory right to bring an action for 
infringement without joining the patent owner, Harvard.”
43
 The 
court held that it did not. Reviewing Harvard’s contractual 
agreement with AsymmetRx, it found that Harvard had not 
conveyed all substantial rights to the patents to AsymmetRx. 
Comparing the facts sub judice with the facts presented in the 
court’s previous decisions on point caused the court to deem the 
case more similar to Abbott than Vaupel or Speedplay.
44
 In 
particular, the court noted that AsymmetRx lacked the ability to 
                                                                                                             
either voluntarily or involuntarily, in any infringement suit brought by an 
exclusive licensee. However, this general rule—which we recognize as being 
prudential rather than constitutional in nature—is subject to an exception. The 
exception is that, where the patentee makes an assignment of all substantial 
rights under the patent, the assignee may be deemed the effective ‘patentee’ 
under 35 U.S.C. § 281 and thus may have standing to maintain an infringement 
suit in its own name.”). 
38
 582 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
39








 Id. at 1318. 
44
 Id. at 1320. 
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“indulge infringements” of the patents under its agreement with 
Harvard, an ability typical of a patent assignee.
45
 
In one of the opinion’s concluding paragraphs, the court 
noted its understanding of, but lack of sympathy for, universities 
attempting to avoid involvement as plaintiffs in infringement 
litigation involving their patents. The court stated: 
 
The provisions of the AsymmetRx License 
may all have met the respective needs of the 
parties; after all, they negotiated and 
executed the agreement. They may also 
reflect the perceived needs of a university 
attempting to balance the public interest 
with commercializing the results of its 
professors’ research. Be that as it may, in 
attempting to meet these goals, the 
contractual result is that Harvard retained 
substantial control over the patent rights it 
was exclusively licensing, such that its 
agreement with AsymmetRx did not convey 
all substantial rights under the patents and 
thus did not make the license tantamount to 
an assignment. AsymmetRx must therefore 




 The court vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor 
of BioCare and remanded, with the admonition that if Harvard 
declined to join the suit voluntarily as a plaintiff it could be added 
involuntarily as a plaintiff.
47
 
B.  Tensions Between Universities and Patents 
As review of the above cases makes clear, the prudential 
standing requirement for owners of exclusively licensed patents 
constrains the ability of such owners to avoid assertive 
involvement in patent infringement lawsuits involving patents to 
which they still maintain substantial rights. The CAFC’s rationale, 
rooted in Supreme Court case law, is that if a licensor could 
decline participation in an infringement lawsuit brought by an 
exclusive licensee, defendants would be unfairly susceptible to 
multiple lawsuits concerning the same alleged act of 
                                                 
45
 Id. at 1321 (“indulge” in this context meaning “to permit”). 
46
 Id. (emphasis added). 
47
 Id. at 1322. 
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 This rationale is readily justified from the 
standpoint of concern for the potential behavior of for-profit 
companies that own and license patents. Unscrupulous companies 
might find incentives not to coordinate their litigation efforts 
precisely for the reason the CAFC fears: the ability to stick the 
same defendant with multiple lawsuits and perhaps multiple 
judgments.   
However, this rationale breaks down from the standpoint of 
universities that own and license patents. Universities are different 
than for-profit actors, or at least historically have held themselves 
out, and sought to be viewed in court, as such.
49
 They are not in the 
business of commercializing their patents through direct 
manufacturing, distribution, and marketing of any ultimate 
                                                 
48
 Accord Greene, supra note 9, at 9-10 (identifying the general interests behind 
the prudential standing requirement as ones of efficiency, economy, justice, and 
uniformity). 
49
 See, e.g., DAVID L. KIRP, SHAKESPEARE, EINSTEIN, AND THE BOTTOM LINE: 
THE MARKETING OF HIGHER EDUCATION 7 (2003) (“[E]mbedded in the very 
idea of the university—not the storybook idea, but the university at its truest and 
best—are values that the market does not honor: the belief in a community of 
scholars and a not a confederacy of self-seekers; in the idea of openness and not 
ownership; in the professor as a pursuer of truth and not an entrepreneur; in the 
student as an acolyte whose preferences are to be formed, not a consumer whose 
preferences are to be satisfied.”); SHEILA SLAUGHTER & GARY RHOADES, 
ACADEMIC CAPITALISM AND THE NEW ECONOMY: MARKETS, STATE, AND 
HIGHER EDUCATION 28-30 (2004) (describing the university’s historic 
attachment to a Mertonian-influenced conception of science as a public good, 
with “strong separation between public and private sectors”). But see DEREK 
BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF 
HIGHER EDUCATION 200 (2003) (lamenting the excessive commercialization of 
higher education and noting that “making money in the world of commerce 
often comes with a Faustian bargain in which universities have to compromise 
their basic values—and thereby risk their very souls—in order to enjoy the 
rewards of the marketplace”); ROGER GEIGER, KNOWLEDGE AND MONEY: 
RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES AND THE PARADOX OF THE MARKETPLACE 181 (2004) 
(“Large amounts of money are at stake, and universities, whether they wish to or 
not, have become actors in the marketplace . . . .”); Duderstadt, supra note 5, at 
61 (“There has been a shift in the priorities of the university: away from the 
pursuit of knowledge and the education of the next generation toward the 
commercial lure of the marketplace.”); Peter Lee, Patents and the University, 63 
DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2013), available at http;//ssrn.com/abstract=2217719. 
Professor Lee notes that “[u]niversities have long played a rhetorically important 
role in society as vanguards of disinterested academic inquiry,” but that “modern 
courts view universities as much more akin to commercial entities.” Id. 
(manuscript at 38-39) (on file with author). Accordingly, he argues, modern 
courts are less likely to defer to unique academic norms, practices, and policies 
that run counter to patent law, preferring instead to rely on and reinforce “a 
conception of universities as integrated into the traditional commercial narrative 
of patents.” Id. at 40. I do not dispute these trends; rather, the proposal I advance 
in this Article is aimed at permitting universities to recapture some of the 
academic exceptionalism that they have lost, whether due to judicial decision or 
their own efforts to work more closely with the market. 
16
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products or services their patents cover. Universities are non-
practicing entities (“NPEs”) whose main missions concern 
teaching, research, and service to society. Society expects 
universities to commercialize their patents through licensing deals 
with industry, not to focus their energies on assertive involvement 
in litigation.
50
 Yet because the CAFC’s prudential standing 
requirement does not differentiate between university patent 
owners and other patent owners, a university with an exclusively 
licensed patent ultimately may face an untenable choice: either 
participate as a co-plaintiff in an enforcement action with an 
exclusive licensee—likely costing the university valuable time and 
money, if not image-related harms as well—or insist that the 
licensee bring the action on its own, risking the university’s 
ultimate forced involvement as a co-plaintiff, as well as potentially 
harming its relationship with the licensee.
51
 In short, what society 
should expect from universities—a preference for their non-
involvement in assertive litigation—is at odds with what the law in 
most instances requires of them. 
A seemingly simple solution to this conundrum would be to 
suggest that universities assign all substantial rights to their 
patents, as opposed to licensing them, so as to rid themselves of 
any obligation to litigate. But this suggestion falls short for several 
reasons. First, universities are understandably reluctant to assign 
their patent rights given the difficulty in determining the fair 
market value of an invention in its early stages of development. 
Better to license a patent of uncertain market potential (subject to 
sales quotas or benchmarks) rather than selling it outright for 
potentially less than its ultimate worth. Second, licenses allow 
universities more flexibility in controlling the use of their patents 
than do assignments. Commercial circumstances can change, and 
these changes are more easily accounted for in licenses wherein 
universities maintain ownership of their patents and more control 
over their commercialization. Third, and perhaps most importantly, 
legal and policy mandates imposed by the Bayh-Dole Act for 
inventions that are developed, in whole or in part, with federal 
funds strongly encourage universities to hold on to their patents 
                                                 
50
 Cf. GARY W. MATKIN, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND THE UNIVERSITY 104 
(1990) (“When universities go into court on patent issues they are particularly 
vulnerable to criticism, since they do not appear to be acting in accordance with 
the public view that they should remain aloof from commercial concerns. . . . 
[N]egative effects can be avoided if the university is not a primary party in a 
suit.”). 
51
 Cf. Greene, supra note 9, at 4, 40 (noting that “[f]or optics reasons or 
otherwise, patent owners—especially universities—may wish to keep their 
names and influence away from patent infringement litigation” and that “one of 
the goals patent owners have in licensing is extricating themselves from the 
possibility of costly litigation”). 
17
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with a view toward furthering the long-term benefits to faculty 
inventors and universities as institutions. Indeed, the Bayh-Dole 
Act stipulates that universities may not assign their ownership of 
patents developed with federal funds without the approval of the 
federal agency that provided those funds, unless the “assignment is 
made to an organization which has as one of its primary functions 
the management of inventions.”
52
  
 The legal and policy constraints discussed above inevitably 
create tensions for universities in their ownership of patents. From 
one perspective, litigating patents can advance a university’s 
research interests and result in revenues that can be used to help 
further those interests. These are public goods that contribute to 
strengthening a research enterprise that fuels innovation and can 
lead to economic development and job growth. Society 
unquestionably benefits when university research lives up to its 
promise to advance knowledge and improve lives. If litigation is 
required to protect research investments, leading to more 
investments and more research, then so be it.  
But litigation is seldom without costs and consequences. In 
addition to the typically significant financial burden
53
 that directly 
affects litigants, more indirectly, no one likes to be sued. 
Legitimate concerns therefore exist that university participation as 
plaintiffs in patent infringement lawsuits may negatively impact 
universities in a variety of ways, from injuring graduates’ job 
prospects at companies named as defendants, to diminishing the 
likelihood that faculty will receive sponsored research funding 
from those companies.
54
 The ability of universities to successfully 
solicit donations from employees and executives at such 
companies may also be affected. Moreover, litigation activity—at 
least by state-supported institutions—also could have a negative 
impact on lawmakers already inclined to second-guess university 
requests for increased appropriations in the face of state budget 
deficits. For these reasons and more, universities might find that 
the prospect of enforcing their patents through litigation strains 
their commitment to innovation. American society, increasingly 
                                                 
52
 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7)(A) (2006). The Bayh-Dole Act fails to clarify what is 
meant by an organization that “has as one of its primary functions the 
management of inventions.” Id. While this provision arguably was intended to 
cover separately-incorporated research and patent foundations closely affiliated 
with universities, it would not seem to prevent universities from assigning patent 
rights to a special breed of NPE—patent assertion entities (“PAEs”)—created 
for the sole purpose of bringing litigation. Indeed, several TTO directors have 
acknowledged the existence of such a market. See Jacob H. Rooksby, When 
Tigers Bare Teeth: A Qualitative Study of University Patent Enforcement, 46 
AKRON L. REV. 169, 196-97 (2013). 
53
 See AIPLA, supra note 3. 
54
 See Jacob H. Rooksby, Sue U., ACADEME, Sept.-Oct. 2012, at 24, 27. 
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dependent on universities for new discoveries that result in 
commercialization, suffers as a result.
55
 
C. Data on Incidence of University Patent Enforcement 
The above Sections describe the legal constraints that may 
compel university patent owners to litigate their patents and the 
tensions such compulsion creates for universities. This Section 
examines the frequency of the activity, what types of institutions 
engage in it, and the varying character of university participation 
as plaintiffs in patent infringement litigation. 
1. Previous Studies and Comments 
Very few previous studies have set out to provide empirical 
understanding of university participation in patent infringement 
litigation. In 2009, Professor Chris Holman conducted perhaps the 
first. He presented findings of a search to locate university 
involvement as plaintiffs in patent infringement lawsuits filed 
between January 1, 2000 and January 24, 2009.
56
 He located 139 
cases where a university joined with an exclusive licensee in 
bringing suit, and another 51 cases where a university brought a 
patent infringement lawsuit without the involvement of a co-
plaintiff.
57
 Following up on Professor Holman’s work two years 
later, I reported findings from a search for patent infringement 
lawsuits filed by universities between January 1, 2009 and 
December 31, 2010.
58
 I found that 33 universities had filed 57 
different patent infringement lawsuits during the studied time 
period, often in conjunction with a licensee co-plaintiff.
59
 
                                                 
55
 Cf. Dennis Crouch, Although “Without Tact,” Micron’s Retaliatory Decision 
to Stop Hiring University of Illinois Graduates Is Not Illegal, PATENTLY-O 
(Apr. 11, 2013, 5:01 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/04/although-
without-tact-microns-retaliatory-decision-to-stop-hiring-university-of-illinois-
graduates-is-not-illegal.html (reporting that a company sued by University of 
Illinois for patent infringement wrote the university to state that it would no 
longer recruit the university’s graduates for employment or fund faculty research 
because of the pending lawsuit); Robin Feldman, Inappropriate Uses of 
Intellectual Property – Intellectual Property Wrongs 68 (Aug. 10, 2012) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2127558 (noting 
“a general sense that the intellectual property system has lost its bearings, 
developing into a multi-dimensional game of strategy in which litigation, rather 
than innovation, is leading the way”). 
56
 Christopher M. Holman, Univ. Patent Litig., Presentation at Santa Clara and 




 Jacob H. Rooksby, University Initiation of Patent Infringement Litigation, 10 
J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 623 (2011). 
59
 Id. at 674-94. 
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While empirical data on the incidence of university 
initiation of patent infringement litigation is limited, many have 
argued anecdotally in the past decade that the activity is not 
infrequent, or from a normative perspective, only should occur 
infrequently. For example, in 2005, Jennifer Washburn argued that 
significant litigation outcomes for some universities—she cited 
high-profile settlements in the hundreds of millions of dollars for 
the University of California and the University of Minnesota—had 
emboldened others to litigate.
60
 A year later, Professor Margo 
Bagley noted “the growth in patent-related litigation involving 
universities” and criticized what she called the overzealous 
initiation of patent infringement litigation by some universities.
61
 
Similarly, writing in 2004, Professor Arti Rai argued that 
universities and their licensees had asserted their basic research 
patents “in a manner that hinders rather than facilitates commercial 
development.”
62
 In 2008, Professor Mark Lemley questioned 
whether universities are patent trolls.
63
 While he persuasively 
answered the question in the negative, others—such as Professor 
Jay Kesan—have advised universities to take great care in 
pursuing enforcement activity, lest they invite the perception that 
their litigation behavior is troll-like.
64
  
Perhaps with some of these arguments in mind, leading 
universities generally have cautioned against initiating patent 
infringement litigation for the purpose of extracting licensing 
revenues. Most notably, in 2006, Stanford University and ten other 
top-tier research universities released a white paper in which they 
urged that universities carefully consider any involvement as 
plaintiffs in patent infringement litigation.
65
 The authors stressed 
that universities should be mindful of their primary mission to use 
patents to promote technology development for the benefit of 
society. To that end, the authors argued that litigation is “seldom 
the preferred option for resolving disputes” and should be initiated 
by the university only if there is a “mission-oriented rationale for 
                                                 
60
 JENNIFER WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY, INC.: THE CORPORATE CORRUPTION OF 
AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 161 (2005). 
61
 Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and Proprietary Rights: Putting 
Patents in Their Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REV. 217, 218-19 (2006). 
62
 Arti K. Rai, The Increasingly Proprietary Nature of Publicly Funded 
Biomedical Research: Benefits and Threats, in BUYING IN OR SELLING OUT? 
THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF THE AMERICAN RESEARCH UNIVERSITY 117, 119 
(Ronald G. Stein ed., 2004). 
63
 See Lemley, supra note 5. 
64
 Jay P. Kesan, Transferring Innovation, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2169, 2193 
(2009). 
65
 In the Public Interest: Nine Points to Consider in Licensing University 
Technology, STANFORD UNIVERSITY 6 (2007), www-
leland.stanford.edu/group/OTL/documents/whitepaper-10.pdf. 
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doing so” that can be clearly articulated to the university and the 
public.
66
 A committee of the National Academy of Sciences 
studying university technology transfer endorsed these 
recommendations in 2010, adding that “enforcement of IP rights 
against suspected infringers should be approached carefully to 
protect the institution’s resources and reputation.”
67
 The committee 
concluded that while universities should be reluctant to resolve 




Taking a different stance on the issue, a patent attorney 
argued in 2009 that universities seldom enforce their patents and 
should be more aggressive in doing so.
69
 In a provocatively 
entitled article in University Business magazine, Alexander 
Poltorak urged universities not to overlook the value of using their 
patents as sticks to seek licenses from companies already using 
technology covered by their patents, recognizing that such activity 
often leads to infringement lawsuits. Believing that much of the 
value of any patent derives from the unspoken threat of litigation, 
Poltorak rejected the notion that aggressive enforcement of patents 
is “beneath” universities or undermines their missions “to serve the 
public and the greater good.”
70
 Citing university bureaucracies and 
red tape that he views as slowing institutional decision-making, 
Poltorak concluded “It’s no wonder that relatively few [patent 
infringement lawsuits] are ever filed by higher ed institutions.”
71
 
He suggested that universities should be more open to enforcing 
their patents through litigation, as doing so could generate revenue 








 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., MANAGING UNIVERSITY 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: COMMITTEE ON 
MANAGEMENT OF UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LESSONS FROM A 
GENERATION OF EXPERIENCE, RESEARCH, AND DIALOGUE 7 (Stephen A. Merrill 
& Anne-Marie Mazza eds., 2011) [hereinafter NRC]. 
68
 Id. at 73. 
69
 Alexander Poltorak, Thar’s Gold in Them Thar Patents: Why It Pays to 
Protect Patent Portfolios, U. BUS., Oct. 2009, at 18, 
http://www.universitybusiness.com/article/thars-gold-them-thar-patents.  
70




 Id. Poltorak’s potential interest in drawing these conclusions should not be 
overlooked. He is CEO of General Patent Corporation, a company that 
specializes in enforcing university patents through creating “special-purpose” 
legal entities that obtain assignments of university patents for the exclusive 
purpose of litigating them. See GEN. PATENT CORP., 
http://university.generalpatent.com/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2013). This 
arrangement removes university ownership over the patent in exchange for a 
contractual right to a portion of any proceeds generated by the “special-purpose” 
entity that subsequently litigates the patent the university once owned. One 
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Recent research shows that some universities appear open 
to using their patents in new ways, aside from pursuing classical 
licensing relationships with companies in industry. Professor 
Robin Feldman and Tom Ewing found that nearly fifty universities 
have contractual arrangements with Intellectual Ventures (“IV”),
73
 
perhaps the most preeminent NPE and patent aggregator to emerge 
in the new complex patent ecosystem.
74
 Ewing and Feldman found 
that some of these universities have sold or licensed their patents 
(or future patent rights) to IV, while others have invested outright 
in IV’s business model, which generally involves using shell 
companies to monetize acquired patents through asserting 
infringement claims against others. The authors noted that the 




2. University Experiences in Litigating Patents 
Some universities have scored decisive victories from their 
past involvements as plaintiffs in patent infringement lawsuits. For 
example, in 2008 a jury awarded Cornell University $184 million 
in damages in a patent infringement lawsuit it brought against 
Hewlett-Packard.
76
 The trial judge later reduced the damages 
award to $71.3 million, and the parties subsequently settled the 
case on confidential terms while appeals were pending.
77
 In 2007, 
the University of California received $30.4 million as part of a 
settlement of a lawsuit it brought with its licensee, Eolas 
                                                                                                             
attribute of this arrangement is that it removes the need for universities to 
participate as named plaintiffs in infringement actions. Another is that it requires 
no out-of-pocket costs to universities, as the entire enforcement activity is 
structured on a contingency fee basis. Some view these attributes as advantages 
to universities, while others see them as proof of the inappropriateness of the 
underlying activity.  
73
 Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 1, 8. 
74
 See Chien, supra note 2, at 312. 
75
 Ewing & Feldman, supra note 73, at 6. Eight other universities located in their 
research (the University of Alabama, Brigham Young University, California 
Institute of Technology, Duke University, University of Florida, University of 
New Mexico, the University of Rochester, and the University of Texas system) 
also are universities that have litigated their patents. See discussion infra 
Subsection I.C.3. 
76
 Bill Steele, Cornell Wins $184 Million Award from Hewlett-Packard for 
Patent Infringement, CORNELL CHRON. (June 6, 2008), 
http://www.news.cornell.edu/stories/June08/HPpatent.ws.html. 
77
 Susan Kelley, Hewlett-Packard, Cornell Reach Settlement in Patent Case, 
CORNELL CHRON. (June 9, 2010), 
http://www.news.cornell.edu/stories/June10/HPCaseClosed.html. 
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Technologies, in 1999 against Microsoft.
78
 The plaintiffs had won 
a $521 million jury verdict earlier in the case in 2003.
79
 The case 
settled while on appeal.  
More recently, in spring of 2012, a judge awarded the 
University of Pittsburgh $73.6 million in a case against Varian 
Medical Systems, Inc.
80
 Later that year, Pitt’s cross-town 
competitor, Carnegie Mellon University, scored a $1.17 billion 
damages award—one of the top three largest damages awards ever 
in a patent infringement case—in a lawsuit it brought against 
Marvell Technology Group Ltd.
81
 Both lawsuits are currently on 
appeal to the CAFC. 
Another notable outcome for a university in a patent 
infringement lawsuit dates back to 1998, when the University of 
Minnesota filed suit against a predecessor to the pharmaceutical 
company GlaxoSmithKline. The university claimed it owned 
patents that covered a blockbuster HIV drug that GlaxoSmithKline 
eventually marketed as Ziagen®. The parties subsequently settled 
the dispute on financial terms quite favorable to the university after 
a year of intense litigation. As part of a license deal, the university 
eventually received more than $350 million in running royalties 
from GlaxoSmithKline’s sales of the drug. These royalties 




Of course, not all patent infringement lawsuits end 
favorably for the universities that bring them. For example, in a 
patent infringement lawsuit brought by the University of Rochester 
in 2000, the CAFC upheld a district court decision that a patent, 
claimed by the university as covering a blockbuster arthritis drug, 
                                                 
78
 Todd Bishop, Microsoft’s Eolas Settlement: UC Gets $30.4M, SEATTLE POST-








 Tom Fontaine, Pitt Awarded $73.6 Million in Patent Case, PITTSBURGH 
TRIBUNE-REVIEW, Apr. 25, 2012, http://triblive.com/news/adminpage/1125208-
74/patent-varian-pitt-million-universities-court-university-percent-sales-award. 
81
 Rich Lord, Carnegie Mellon Wins $1.17 Billion in Patent Case, PITTSBURGH 
POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 27, 2012, http://www.post-
gazette.com/stories/local/neighborhoods-city/carnegie-mellon-wins-117-billion-
in-patent-case-668013/; see also Ben Kersey, Marvell Hit with $1.17 Billion 
Damages Verdict in Patent Infringement Case, VERGE (Dec. 27, 2012, 8:56 
AM) (characterizing damages as “one of the largest patent verdicts in history,” 
exceeded only by Microsoft v. Lucent Technologies ($1.52 billion) and Abbott 
Laboratories v. Centocor Ortho Biotech ($1.67 billion)).  
82
 Katherine Lymn, U Heads for ‘Patent Cliff’,  MINNESOTA DAILY, Oct. 6, 
2011, http:// http://www.mndaily.com\/print/67409. 
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 The university allegedly had established an eight-
figure legal fund to support its lawsuit against the company it 
believed was infringing.
84
 In a different case, the CAFC overturned 
a $1.67 billion jury award in a patent infringement lawsuit brought 
by New York University and its licensee over patents co-owned by 
the university.
85
 The significant damages award is still the largest 
ever achieved in a patent infringement case.
86
  
More recently, in February 2012, a jury in the Eastern 
District of Texas invalidated a patent owned by the University of 
California in a subsequent lawsuit with its licensee Eolas 
Technologies against twenty-three different companies, including 
Apple, Google, Amazon.com, and Sun Microsystems.
87
 The 
university’s patent was described as covering the interactive Web, 
particularly as it relates to plug-ins for Web browsers.
88
 World 
Wide Web inventor Tim Berners-Lee, who testified at trial in favor 
of the defendants, tweeted that the verdict was a “good thing.”
89
 
3. Lawsuits Filed, 1973 – 2012 
Building on the two previous empirical studies described 
above, I set out to identify every patent infringement lawsuit in 
which a university had participated as a plaintiff, going back as far 
as historical records allowed.
90
 Westlaw maintains records of 
patent infringement lawsuits in a database called Derwent LitAlert. 
                                                 
83
 See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 
2004). 
84
 Goldie Blumenstyk, Taking on Goliath: U. of Rochester Risks Millions in 
Patent Fight with Pharmaceutical Giants, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 20, 
2002, at A27. 
85
 See Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 636 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). 
86
 See Kersey, supra note 81. 
87
 Steven E.F. Brown, Eolas Sues 23 Companies After Beating Microsoft in 
Patent Fight, SAN FRANCISCO BUS. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2009, 2:57 PM), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/stories/2009/10/05/daily33.html; Marc 
Parry, Jury Decides Against U. of California in Major Patent Fight Over the 




 John Ribeiro, Eolas Loses in Web Patents Claim Against Google and Others, 






 I conducted the majority of this research of historical lawsuit filings in the fall 
of 2011 for my doctoral dissertation. See generally Rooksby, supra note 1 
(describing study of universities that litigate patents). The resulting population 
was subsequently surveyed, as further described in infra Section II.A. Lawsuit 
filings for years 2011 and 2012 were compiled using the same methods 
described in this Section. See infra note 92. 
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The database relies on reports of patent infringement lawsuit 
filings with the Commissioner of the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office, as is required of federal district courts at the 
time such cases are filed. While coverage of cases dates back to 




With this limitation in mind, I searched the Derwent 
LitAlert database for every patent infringement lawsuit containing 
a university as a plaintiff, using LexMachina and PACER to assist 
in verifying that returned cases met the inclusion criteria.
92
 My 
initial search, conducted in July of 2011, returned 6,091 records. I 
reviewed these records to determine which potentially 
corresponded to (1) patent infringement lawsuits that (2) had at 
least one university as a plaintiff.
93
 Fewer than ten percent (N = 




Of the records that appeared to meet the inclusion criteria, I 
conducted detailed follow-up searches to confirm that the returned 
records corresponded to cases that actually met the criteria. By 
reviewing case information contained in LexMachina and PACER, 
I determined that many records appearing to meet the inclusion 
                                                 
91
 Other resources exist for researching patent infringement filings, although 
these, too, have limitations. For example, the LexMachina database is very 
comprehensive, but only for cases filed in the year 2000 or later. The Public 
Access to Court Electronic Records (“PACER”) system maintained by the 
federal government also is a good resource, but searching in it is costly and 
tedious, as only court-specific searches in each of the 94 federal district courts 
are possible. 
92
 My exact search language was: plf(trustee* universit! college* institute* 
board* regent* research technolog! educat!) ow(trustee* universit! college* 
institute* board* regent* research technolog! educat!) pas(trustee* universit! 
college* institute* board* regent* research technolog! educat!) & da(aft 
12/31/1972 & bef 01/01/2011). I defined university as, regardless of name, any 
non-profit, public or private, undergraduate- and graduate-degree granting 
institution located in the United States that engages in patenting and technology 
transfer. I included separately incorporated entities controlled by or closely 
affiliated with universities—such as research or patent foundations—within the 
meaning of the term university. I did not include institutions that grant only 
undergraduate or graduate degrees. 
93
 December 31, 2010 was the effective end date for the initial search. I followed 
this same process in April of 2012 and January of 2013 to identify all cases 
meeting the inclusion criteria for the years 2011 and 2012, respectively. 
94
 The majority of the returned records were false positives, consisting of 
information about patent infringement lawsuits brought by companies with the 
word technology or research in their corporate name. Additional false positives 
included records corresponding to patent infringement lawsuits brought by 
foreign universities or non-profit entities not meeting my definition of 
university; university actions to challenge patent ownership or inventorship; and 
trademark infringement lawsuits brought by universities. The incidence of false 
negatives is unknown but believed to be de minimis, if existent at all. 
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criteria in fact did not (e.g., the corresponding case did not have a 
university as a plaintiff, or even if it did, did not involve claims of 
patent infringement).
95
 Of the records that appeared to meet the 
inclusion criteria, 284 corresponded to cases that were confirmed 
as meeting the criteria.
96
 I made two categorical exclusions in 
deciding which cases met the inclusion criteria. First, I excluded 
any case where a university was added as a plaintiff after 
commencement of the action. Operating under the assumption that 
a party’s decision to sue is a meaningful one,
97
 I wanted to know 
how many lawsuits contained universities from the outset of the 
case.
98
 Second, I excluded cases in which universities levied 
infringement allegations from a defensive posture (such as in 
response to a declaratory judgment action). These two exclusions 
were reasonable but arbitrary. I made them because my preference 
was to under-report, as opposed to over-report, the number of 
universities that have litigated patents and the number of patent 
infringement lawsuits with universities as plaintiffs.  
Table 1 displays the number of confirmed patent 
infringement lawsuits involving universities as plaintiffs, as well as 
the number of universities participating in those lawsuits, during 
the studied time period. Graph 1 displays these data graphically; 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics.   
                                                 
95
 Records for cases filed between 1973 and 1990 were the most difficult to 
confirm as meeting the inclusion criteria, as information about these cases could 
not be found in LexMachina or through PACER. Fortunately, search results 
obtained in the ALLFEDS database in Westlaw confirmed many of these cases. 
I considered a case confirmed if a judicial opinion provided enough information 
to verify the case style, court in which it was brought, case number, and that the 
dispute involved an allegation of patent infringement by the university plaintiff. 
Several judicial opinions also revealed that records believed to meet the 
inclusion criteria did not in fact correspond to a case involving an allegation of 
patent infringement by the university plaintiff. Internet searches were conducted 
for those records corresponding to cases filed between 1973 and 1990 for which 
no judicial opinion could be located. Several cases were confirmed in this 
manner. Sources of confirmation included the following: dated journal articles 
subsequently made available online that discussed the litigation; biographies of 
attorneys that listed their involvement in previous cases; and 10-K filings made 
electronic by the Securities and Exchange Commission in which a company 
discussed significant litigation involvements. 
96
 Only sixteen records contained information about cases that could not be 
confirmed as meeting the inclusion criteria. All other cases identified in the 
returned records were confirmed as not meeting the inclusion criteria. 
97
 Plaintiffs are commonly referred to as masters of the complaint. See, e.g., 
Garbie v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 211 F.3d 407, 410 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(“[P]laintiffs as masters of the complaint may include (or omit) claims or parties 
. . . .”). This mastery entails a strategic advantage that permits them to decide not 
only whom to sue and where, but which parties to include as fellow plaintiffs at 
the outset of the litigation.  
98
 Strict adherence to this rule led to my including in the dataset a case in which 
Drexel University was named as an involuntary plaintiff.  
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Number of University-Initiated Patent Infringement Lawsuits 
and Number of Universities Participating per Year 
 







1973 0 0 
1974 0 0 
1975 1 1 
1976 1 1 
1977 0 0 
1978 0 0 
1979 1 1 
1980 0 0 
1981 0 0 
1982 1 1 
1983 0 0 
1984 0 0 
1985 0 0 
1986 2 2 
1987 0 0 
1988 0 0 
1989 7 4 
1990 7 5 
1991 3 4 
1992 2 2 
1993 4 4 
1994 8 8 
1995 3 3 
1996 6 6 
1997 7 4 
1998 7 6 
1999 4 3 
2000 11 8 
2001 10 7 
2002 15 13 
2003 10 7 
2004 14 7 
2005 7 5 
2006 15 10 
2007 20 19 
2008 25 18 
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2009 32 22 
2010 24 16 
2011 37 18 
2012 43 22 
 
Graph 1 
Number of University-Initiated Patent Infringement Lawsuits 




Table 2  



































As noted in Graph 1, the number of patent infringement 
lawsuits with universities as plaintiffs has not increased each year 
over time, nor has the number of individual universities that have 
participated as plaintiffs in such lawsuits increased each year over 
time. However, both metrics are trending upward, with significant 
                                                 
99
 For a listing of the case styles for all cases in the dataset except those filed in 
2011 and 2012, see Rooksby, supra note 1, at 224-50. Copies of the complaints 
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growth noted beginning in the year 2000.
100
 Some of this increase 
may be attributable to increased accuracy of the database around 
this time, meaning that pre-2000 results are particularly under-
inclusive. Regardless, university involvement as plaintiffs in patent 
infringement litigation was at least as prevalent as indicated in 
Table 1 and Graph 1 over the past forty years.
101
 Appendix B 
contains further description of the universities in the dataset across 
a variety of metrics. 
 
II. A STUDY OF UNIVERSITIES THAT LITIGATE PATENTS 
 
A. Background and Methodology 
Targeting largely the population of universities identified in 
Table 4 in Appendix B, I set out to better understand university 
decision-making and structural frameworks concerning 
involvement as plaintiffs in patent infringement litigation. Three 
general research questions drove my inquiry: 
 
                                                 
100
 Some of this growth may be consistent with, or even explained in part by, a 
general increase in patent litigation in the past decade. See Terry Ludlow, U.S. 
Patent Litigations Reach All Time High in 2011, CHIPWORKS (Mar. 8, 2012), 
http://www.chipworks.com/blog/technologyblog/2012/03/08/u-s-patent-
litigations-reach-all-time-high-in-2011/ (noting growth in patent litigation); 
Gene Quinn, The Rise of Patent Litigation in America: 1980-2012, 
IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/04/09/the-rise-
of-patent-litigation-in-america-1980-2012/id=38910/ (same). But regardless of 
general trends in patent litigation, or university involvement in patent litigation 
as a percentage of total infringement lawsuits brought each year, my argument is 
that university involvement in patent litigation is significant enough in real 
numbers (as indicated in Graph 1), and qualitatively different than patent 
litigation brought solely by for-profit actors, to merit its own individualized 
attention. 
101
 Again, limitations inherent in the searched database affected these results, 
unquestionably causing them to be underinclusive. For example, two patent 
infringement lawsuits brought by the University of Michigan before 2010 were 
not returned in my initial search, despite their meeting the search criteria. See 
Complaint, Repligen Corp. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. 2:06-CV-00004-
TJW-CE (E.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2006) (No. 1); Complaint, Reagents [sic] of the 
University of Michigan v. GeneSearch, L.L.C., No. 5:00-CV-60250-MOB (E.D. 
Mich. May 10, 2000) (No. 1) (filed in conjunction with Michigan State 
University). Although University of Michigan appears in Table 4 (in Appendix 
B) due to its participation in a lawsuit brought in 2012, for whatever reason, 
records for the two earlier cases simply do not exist within the Derwent LitAlert 
database. Because this fact was not discovered until after data collection for the 
survey described in Section II.A was completed, the survey did not include the 
University of Michigan in the targeted population. Unknown is the number of 
other universities or lawsuits involving universities as plaintiffs that should have 
been captured by the search methodology but were not. 
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1. Do these universities report having institutional policies 
that address their potential involvement as plaintiffs in 
patent infringement litigation?  
 
2. What do their chief research officers (“CROs”)102 
indicate they believe concerning: 
a. the considerations important to their universities in 
deciding whether to initiate patent infringement 
litigation,  
 
b. the likelihood that their universities would initiate 
patent infringement litigation again in the future, 
and  
 
c. the extent to which their universities’ research 
missions are furthered through initiation of patent 
infringement litigation?  
 
3. Finally, do significant differences exist between public 
and private universities in the conclusions reached in 
answering the aforementioned questions?  
 
I structured the study as an explanatory mixed-methods 
design, meaning I gathered survey data to analyze quantitatively, 
then used select qualitative follow-up interviews to help analyze 
and interpret that data.
103
 As my study was the first to examine the 
opinions of university decision-makers on these topics in 
comprehensive fashion, no survey instrument existed that could be 
drawn upon or used. Accordingly, I created an instrument 
containing twenty closed-ended questions for online use via a 
                                                 
102
 I selected CROs (typically called vice presidents for research, or vice 
provosts for research) for participation for several reasons. First, technology 
transfer activities generally fall under the purview of CROs at research 
universities. See MATKIN, supra note 50, at 108. Therefore, CROs are likely to 
be involved in university decisions to litigate patents and are likely to be 
familiar with, or have ready access to information about, past patent 
infringement lawsuits brought by their university. Second, CROs typically are 
tenured faculty members who have assumed a senior-level administrative 
position. Therefore, unlike directors of TTOs or university attorneys (both of 
whom usually do not have faculty appointments), CROs are uniquely situated to 
opine on institutional policies and practices concerning the university’s research 
operation. Finally, their opinions and beliefs about the studied activity also are 
particularly relevant, as they are charged with directing policy for their 
universities with respect to research-related activities. 
103
 See JOHN W. CRESWELL, EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH: PLANNING, 
CONDUCTING, AND EVALUATING QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
560 (3d ed. 2008) (describing an explanatory study design). 
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 I drew on pilot interviews of 
TTO directors at the 2011 annual meeting of the Association of 
University Technology Managers (“AUTM”) and existing 
literature to draft relevant questions.
105
 These questions were then 
pre-tested for content appropriateness and relevancy and refined as 
a result of close consultation with an in-house counsel and TTO 




On August 1, 2011, I sent a letter to the CRO
107
 at 63 of the 
universities in the population, inviting their participation.
108
 The 
letters expressly asked recipients to identify an alternate person 
within their university to complete the survey if they felt they had 
been misidentified or preferred that someone else complete it.
109
 
                                                 
104
 Appendix A contains a complete copy of the survey instrument and also 
presents an executive summary of data for each question. The survey questions 
were divided into the following three categories: background information, 
institutional policies, and professional beliefs. The background information 
section contained a question asking whether the participant’s university is public 
or private. Responses to that question allowed for stratification by university 
funding source (public or private). Questions concerning institutional policies 
were yes/no questions, whereas questions concerning professional beliefs held 
by the participants had a mixture of Likert-scale, best-choice, and rank-order 
response choices. At their option, participants were permitted to enter comments 
in dialogue boxes after 17 of the 20 questions (the other three questions, such as 
“Is your university public or private?”, did not lend themselves to comments).  
105
 See generally Rooksby, supra note 52 (describing qualitative study of TTO 
directors concerning patent infringement litigation). 
106
 See generally RONALD CZAJA & JOHNNY BLAIR, DESIGNING SURVEYS: A 
GUIDE TO DECISIONS AND PROCEDURES (2d ed. 2005) (describing the 
appropriateness of these steps in creating a survey instrument). 
107
 I identified these individuals and their addresses by visiting each university’s 
website. For those universities in the population that are university systems—for 
example, the University of California, which has ten campuses—I sent the 
introductory letter to the CRO or individual at the system level who appeared to 
be responsible for research and technology transfer activities within the system. 
Six university systems had an identifiable system-level CRO, whereas another 
six did not. Universities in the population that are part of university systems, but 
nevertheless litigated in their own name, received a letter directly (for example, I 
sent the CRO at the University of Wisconsin-Madison a letter, but did not send 
one to the system-level CRO or equivalent).  
108
 Because I collected lawsuit data for the years 2011 and 2012 after I 
conducted the survey described in this section, invitations were not sent to the 
six universities that filed their first patent infringement lawsuit in 2011 
(University of Arizona, Brandeis University, and Rensselaer Polytechnic 
Institute) or 2012 (Florida Atlantic University, University of South Alabama, 
and University of South Florida). In addition, as mentioned supra, no invitation 
was sent to the University of Michigan. 
109
 Eleven CROs responded with such information, mostly asking that the survey 
be sent to their university’s TTO director. Two additional CROs responded to 
notify me that their university would not participate in the survey. One other 
participant dropped out after seeking and receiving a complete copy of the 
survey instrument to review with his university’s general counsel. 
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On August 22, I sent emails to the amended list of participants that 
contained a link to the online survey.
110
 Given the perceived 
sensitivity of the topic, I decided to collect the survey data 
anonymously, without requiring participants to identify themselves 
or their institution.
111
 The survey closed on September 19 (four 
weeks after it opened), after two reminder emails had been sent. 
Twenty-two of 63 universities initially targeted completed the 
survey for a response rate of 36.7%.
112
 
Of the 22 universities that completed the survey, 13 were 
public and 9 were private. The array of university participants 
included universities new to the activity (such as Catholic 
University and Michigan Technological University) and others 
more experienced (such as Johns Hopkins University, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the University of 
California). Table 3 lists all the universities that completed the 
survey. The actual participants at these universities consisted 
mostly of TTO directors (n = 10, or 45.5%) and CROs (n = 6, or 
27.3%), as indicated by anonymized data from the survey 
concerning job titles.  
 
Table 3 
Universities That Completed the Survey 
 
Brigham Young University 
Catholic University 
Iowa State University 
Johns Hopkins University 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Michigan Technological University 
North Carolina State University 
Northwestern University 
Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey 
Saint Louis University 
Temple University 
Tufts University 
                                                 
110
 The survey was administered online through QuestionPro, an online survey 
administration tool. 
111
 Participants were notified at every solicitation contact that their responses to 
the survey would be anonymous. I also stressed that the survey did not concern 
the details of any specific past, pending, or contemplated litigation, and was 
instead only intended to solicit information concerning institutional policies and 
each participant’s individual opinion concerning their institution’s decision-
making with respect to assertive patent enforcement. 
112
 This percentage is drawn from 60 universities, not 63, given that three 
targeted participants never received links to the online survey in light of their 
responses to my introductory letter. See supra note 109. 
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University of Alabama at Birmingham 
University of California  
University of Maryland-College Park 
University of Massachusetts  
University of Rochester 
University of Utah 
University of Virginia 
University of Washington 
Virginia Commonwealth University 
 
The survey questions were grouped into four categories for 
purposes of data analysis: those aimed at obtaining data to answer 
research question 1, research question 2(a), research question 2(b), 
and research question 2(c). Survey response data were segregated 
into these four categories, stratified by public and private 
universities so as to answer research question 3. Descriptive and 
non-parametric statistics were used to analyze results and answer 
the relevant research questions.
113
  
The last item on the survey allowed participants to leave 
their email address if they were willing to participate in a follow-
up phone interview with me.
114
 Ultimately three participant 
interviews were conducted in November of 2011, in tape-recorded 
sessions lasting 20 to 30 minutes.
115
 The purpose of these 
interviews was to gain deeper understanding into some of the 
patterns that emerged from the survey data and to aid in 
meaningfully interpreting and contextualizing the survey’s key 
                                                 
113
 Both Mann-Whitney’s U test and the chi-square test for independence were 
used to test for statistically significant differences between the responses of 
public and private universities, depending on question design (i.e., whether the 
question permitted collection of ordinal or nominal data). The null hypothesis 
for each question stated that there was no statistical difference between 
responses to the question by respondents at public and private universities. The 
null hypothesis was retained for all but one answer choice on the survey. 
Cohen’s conventions were followed for analyzing the strength of the effect size. 
See JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL 
SCIENCES (2d ed. 1988). As recommended in the non-parametric statistics 
literature, Fisher’s Exact Test was used to provide p-values for 2 x 2 
contingency tables and when returned scores for 2 x 3 contingency tables 
effectively rendered them 2 x 2. For more information on these tests, see 
GREGORY W. CORDER & DALE I. FOREMAN, NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICS FOR 
NON-STATISTICIANS: A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH 179-85 (2009); and JAMES J. 
HIGGINS, AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICS 172-75 
(2004). 
114
 These e-mail addresses were reported to me apart from the survey data, 
therefore the solicitation of this information did not compromise the anonymity 
of the survey data. 
115
 Interviews were transcribed to aid analysis.  
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findings. Several comments from the interviewees are quoted in 
the sections below.  
B.  Summary of Results 
This Section details the study’s general findings as they 
relate to the four research questions.  
1. Research Question 1 – Litigation Policies  
Data from the study indicate that universities generally 
have not established formal institutional policies or frameworks 
intended to address their potential involvement as plaintiffs in 
patent infringement litigation. This finding challenged my 
assumption that universities that had litigated patents in the past 
would have established institutional policies or frameworks to 
facilitate their involvement in the activity again in the future. For 
example, I expected respondents to indicate that their universities 
had established affiliated patent or research foundations partly so 
that those entities could participate in litigation in place of the 
university proper.
116
 In fact, very few (n = 3, or 13.6%) indicated 
that their universities had done so.  
I also expected respondents to indicate that their 
universities have a formal policy or set of guidelines to follow in 
determining whether to participate as a plaintiff in patent 
infringement litigation. Again, few (n = 2, or 9.1%) said that they 
do.
117
 Equally surprising to me were responses to a question asking 
whether respondents’ universities set aside money each year in a 
budget for potential use as a plaintiff in patent infringement 
litigation. Given the high cost of participating in infringement 
litigation, particularly if pursued without a licensee, I expected 
many to indicate that they accounted for their occasional 
involvement in the activity in a budget. However, only one 
respondent indicated that his university does so. Interviewees were 
less surprised by this finding. While they uniformly agreed that 
universities should be more proactive in planning for the costs of 
patent infringement litigation, practical realities prevent it, they 
said.  
                                                 
116
 Matkin makes this suggestion, calling such entities “buffer organizations.” 
See MATKIN, supra note 50, at 171-72. 
117
 This finding, however, did not surprise interviewees. One told me that “The 
decision process of litigation is so dynamic and so organic that it does not lend 
itself to policy.” Rooksby, supra note 1, at 140 (all interviews conducted for the 
study were confidential, and therefore names and positions of interviewees are 
not provided in this or subsequent citations to interviewees). Another described 
it “a complicated enough business” that it “defies policies that would be 
helpful.” Id. at 141. 
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In short, few universities in the study reported having 
established institutional policies or frameworks to address their 
potential involvement as plaintiffs in patent infringement litigation, 
and some university decision-makers I spoke with indicated they 
saw no need for such policies or frameworks. While some 
university decision-makers perceive value in budgeting for patent 
infringement litigation, very few universities actually do so. 
Finally, even though university-affiliated patent or research 
foundations can preclude the need for direct university 
involvement as plaintiffs in patent infringement litigation, few 
universities in the study reported having established an affiliated 
patent or research foundation for that reason.  
2. Research Question 2(a) – Considerations  
I expected survey respondents to indicate that 
considerations with direct financial implications—such as who 
pays for litigation, the beliefs held by licensees, and a lawsuit’s 
potential impact on donations to the university or private-sector 
funding of faculty research—are important to university decisions 
whether to initiate patent infringement litigation. Considerations 
with attenuated financial implications—such as concerns for views 
held by the public, the potential ideological opposition of students 
and non-inventor faculty, and perceived ethical or professional 
obligations—seemed less likely to be cited as influencing decision-




The data largely proved these hypotheses correct. Over 
81% of respondents (n = 18) indicated that the potential monetary 
returns to their university from suing for patent infringement are 
typically highly relevant to their decision whether to bring suit. 
Fewer (n = 14, or 63.6%) indicated that indirect costs (in the form 
of diverted attention from faculty and professionals, emotional 
strain caused by the litigation, and public relations concerns) are 
highly relevant. At the same time, many respondents indicated that 
they are sensitive to the high costs of legal fees. Over 63% of 
respondents (n = 14) indicated that their university is more likely 
to favor bringing an infringement lawsuit if a licensee pays for 
some of the university’s legal fees.  
One question on the survey concerned the identity of a 
prospective infringer. Respondents were sharply divided as to 
whether defendant identity influences their institution’s decision-
making. Nearly 41% of respondents (n = 9) indicated a potential 
                                                 
118
 See NRC, supra note 67, at 7 (citing “disregard by infringer of scientific or 
professional norms and standards” as potential reason for asserting patent 
rights). 
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defendant’s identity is irrelevant to their university’s decision-
making. However, the same amount indicated that a defendant’s 
political influence and its financial contributions to the university 
are considerations that their university weighs heavily in deciding 
whether to participate as a plaintiff in patent infringement 
litigation. Presumably concerned for potential financial retribution 
in state budgeting processes, respondents at public universities are 
more sensitive to a defendant’s political influence than are 
respondents at private universities, to a statistically significant 
degree.
119
 Respondents also frequently cited a prospective 
defendant’s financial and litigation resources (n = 7, or 31.8%), as 
well as its prominence in the community (n = 6, or 27.3%), as 
considerations heavily weighed at their universities.  
Another question concerned whose opinions hold the most 
influence in university decisions to litigate patents. Responses 
indicated that the opinions of university in-house counsels are the 
most prioritized, but most respondents (n = 14, or 63.6%) also 
indicated that the actual or anticipated opinion of their university’s 
licensee(s) weighs heavily. In fact, more respondents cited the 
licensee’s opinion as weighing heavily than cited the opinion of 
their university’s president (n = 10, or 45.5%) or governing board 
(n = 8, or 36.4%). No respondent indicated that the actual or 
anticipated views of the public, students, or faculty (other than 
those who invented the patents being infringed) weigh heavily in 
their university’s decision-making. 
Interviewees attributed many respondents’ deference to the 
opinions of licensees as reflecting confidence in their greater 
understanding of the market and the nature of patent infringement 
litigation. As one interviewee explained, “Our governing board or 
our president, or whatever internal decision-making structures we 
have, are not likely to be knowledgeable about the specific 
dynamics of the licensee’s industry, or knowledgeable enough to 
be the primary decision-maker about the litigation.”
120
 Another 
saw university deference to licensees in matters of infringement as 
“part and parcel [of] what we have empowered the licensee to do 
when we give them the commercial right to use our patent.”
121
  
This sentiment also was expressed in response to a survey 
question concerning motivating factors to litigate. The majority of 
respondents (n = 15, or 68.2%) cited the university’s contractual 
obligation to protect the rights of existing licensees as weighing 
heavily in university decision-making. Fewer expressed that 
litigating could further the university’s public-serving mission (n = 




= 5.594, p = 0.025,  = 0.504. 
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7, or 31.8%) or generate revenue through a damages award (n = 8, 
or 36.4%) or out-of-court settlement (n = 6, or 27.3%).  
Interviewees interpreted the strong concern for the 
university’s contractual obligations to licensees as entirely 
appropriate given the important role licensees play in university 
technology transfer. All referred to licensees as university 
“partners” and expressed bewilderment at the notion that any 
university might place primacy on other interests with respect to 
decision-making about patent infringement litigation. As one 
interviewee stated: 
 
We have to abide by the contract. So if we 
have a contract that obliges us to participate 
in litigation, even just in name, then we have 
to honor that contract. . . . [Universities] also 
have relationships with their licensees. It’s 
not a naked transaction. And so the licensees 
are business partners with the institution. 
And so they are going to have influence on 





 Another interviewee explained the importance of honoring 
contracts with licensees concerning infringement litigation in terms 
of what disregarding a contract with a licensee could do to the 
university’s further licensing efforts. This interviewee noted, “If it 
got out that we exclusively licensed a technology to a company, 
and were not willing to stand behind that company in a patent 




3. Research Question 2(b) – Likelihood to Litigate 
Several questions on the survey were designed to elicit data 
concerning the likelihood that respondents’ universities would 
initiate patent infringement litigation again in the future. While 
specific predictions were not sought, the data allowed for a general 
conclusion that the studied universities are open to litigating their 
patents again in the future. In fact, decision-makers at most (n = 
14, or 63.6%) of the surveyed universities feel that it is inevitable 
that their university will do so again, given the number of patents 
in their portfolio. Many (n = 16, or 72.7%) also indicated that they 
viewed participating as a plaintiff in patent infringement litigation 
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to be an unavoidable consequence of engaging in patenting and 
technology transfer.  
Whether to assert a patent by filing a lawsuit is not an 
infrequent topic of discussion at many of the studied universities. 
Fifteen respondents (68.2%) indicated that they had discussed with 
a colleague at their university one or more times in the past year 
whether their university should participate as a plaintiff in patent 
infringement litigation against an infringer of one of the 
university’s patents. Two (9.1%) respondents reported having had 
these discussions more than 10 times in the preceding year.  
A question on the survey concerning projected monetary 
returns from engaging in patent infringement litigation generated a 
variety of responses. The question asked respondents to indicate 
the lowest range of projected monetary returns to their university 
over which the institution would consider litigating. Five 
respondents (22.7%) indicated that projected monetary returns do 
not factor into their university’s decision-making; presumably 
these universities are willing to defend their patents through 
litigation on principle. For the remaining respondents, $250,000 to 
$499,000 was the average range of projected monetary returns to 
their university that in their opinion would make the lawsuit worth 
pursuing. Several respondents (n = 5, or 22.7%) indicated that they 
would bring suit for less than that range, including one respondent 
who selected $0 to $999 as the lowest range. Six respondents 
(27.3%) selected $1 million to $9 million as the lowest projected 
range. No respondent selected a range above $10 million to $49 
million (that range was selected by one respondent). 
Interviewees saw the variety of responses to this question 
as emblematic of a larger tension within the industry between 
principled stances on enforcement and realistic approaches to 
enforcement in light of resource constraints. As one interviewee 
put it: 
 
The philosophical dilemma is, do you 
litigate because you’re protecting your asset, 
or do you litigate for the homerun? So [the 
results to this question reflect] a difference 
of opinions about why you litigate. Those 
that litigate because it’s the responsible 
thing to do to protect the asset care less 
about the likelihood of award, and those that 
are doing it just for the money, you see it’s 
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 Another interviewee echoed these sentiments, noting that 
what universities view as ideal behavior can be tempered by 
business realities: 
 
It’s a question of being idealistic versus 
practical. I don’t think universities want to 
feel like they make decisions on licensing or 
enforcing patents that are based on monetary 
return. What you want to do is get your 
technology used for the benefit of society 
and money shouldn’t come into play. So 
that’s the idealistic approach. As a practical 
matter, if you’re spending a million to get 
half a million, that’s not a very good 
business decision. And although we’re not-




 I also sought to understand to what extent a university’s 
past involvement in patent infringement litigation might influence 
its future involvement. The majority of respondents (n = 12, or 
54.6%) indicated that their university’s past experience as a 
plaintiff was not likely to influence its future participation as a 
plaintiff. As one respondent in the majority on this question wrote 
in an open-ended textual submission, “Our past experience has 
added more wisdom to how we make such a decision but has not 
influenced what that decision might be.” Fewer than half of the  
respondents (n = 9, or 40.9%) indicated that their university’s past 
experience as a plaintiff in patent infringement litigation made 
their university’s future participation as a plaintiff somewhat 
likely, likely, or extremely likely.
126
 
4. Research Question 2(c) – Litigation As Mission 
Enhancing 
Two questions on the survey were designed to solicit data 
concerning the extent to which respondents believe their 
universities’ research missions are furthered through enforcing 
patents in infringement litigation. One survey question addressed 
this issue directly while another approached it indirectly. When 
asked about the issue directly, respondents were sharply divided on 




 I also asked respondents about the potential impact of past patent 
infringement lawsuits where their university had been named as a defendant. 
Most either were unaware of any such lawsuit (n = 16, or 72.7%) or indicated 
any such lawsuit had no impact on future participation as a plaintiff (n = 6, or 
27.3%). 
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whether their universities’ research missions are furthered through 
participation as plaintiffs in patent infringement litigation. Slightly 
over half of respondents (n = 12, or 54.6%) disagreed with the 
proposition that participating as a plaintiff in patent infringement 
litigation furthers their university’s mission as a research 
institution. However, when initiation of patent infringement 
litigation was framed as an extension of investment in research and 
obtaining patents, the overwhelming majority of respondents (n = 
20, or 90.9%) had no difficulty reconciling the activity on those 
terms (i.e., they agreed with the statement “If we are willing to 
invest in research and incur costs to obtain patents, we must be 
willing to sue infringers of our patents”).  
This finding suggests that while most universities see 
infringement litigation as a logical continuation of investments in 
research and patenting, many are quite hesitant to announce that 
the activity furthers their research missions, believing the two 
unrelated or even at odds. Indeed, only one respondent (4.5%) felt 
strongly that the activity furthers his university’s research mission, 
compared to four (18.2%) who felt strongly that it does not.   
Interviewees expounded further on these tensions and 
differences of viewpoint. All believed that no university views 
patent infringement litigation as an activity in which it actively 
hopes to engage. At the same time, they recognized that the 
activity can further goals that are intimately tied to a university’s 
research agenda. As an interviewee put it: 
 
Is the act of litigation itself furthering a 
mission? No, I mean litigation never furthers 
a mission in terms of it being something you 
ever aspire to do, or a real objective of the 
university . . . . Litigation is not one of them. 
But if you think about it in terms of whether 
it is a necessary part of protecting and 
advancing our research, then you come up 
with a different answer. . . . To me it’s a 
necessary evil—I’ll go ahead and use that 
word. If you’re going to go forward and 
protect patents, the necessary follow-on to 





Another interviewee further parsed the tricky relationship 
between research mission and patent enforcement in terms of 
universities’ mandates to disseminate technology: 
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I believe litigation is not inconsistent with 
our research mission, because our research 
mission is to disseminate, and dissemination 
requires investment, which requires return, 
which requires protection. And if you’re not 
willing to protect technology, that inhibits 
its dissemination more broadly and more 
generally. . . . I can’t imagine how you could 
be in the business of licensing and not view 
litigation as critical to your strategy. Why 




5. Research Question 3 – Public/Private Differences 
No statistically significant differences existed in the 
answers that decision-makers at public and private universities 
provided in this study’s survey, with one exception: decision-
makers at public universities are more sensitive than decision-
makers at private ones to the perceived political influence of a 
potential defendant.  
C. University Approaches to Patent Infringement 
Litigation  
The data from the study reported above show a division in 
approaches to patent infringement litigation among universities 
that have litigated their patents before. While some universities 
that have litigated their patents in the past appear to be willing 
pursuers of infringers and prepared participants in assertive patent 
infringement litigation, many are not so committed. By empirically 
identifying these varying approaches to the activity, this study 
contributes to growing understanding of complex decision-making 
about university efforts to protect and enforce institution-owned 
intellectual property. 
1. The Minority Approach: Willing Pursuers 
and Prepared Participants 
A minority of universities that litigate patents are 
comfortable with the concept of enforcing patent rights. At these 
universities, decision-makers have accepted that ownership and 
enforcement of patents are intimately tied. Pursuing infringement 
litigation helps protect institutional investments into research and 
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patenting. These universities are committed to litigating their 
patents if the facts warrant, regardless of the infringer’s identity 
and, while cost conscious, without undue concern for the activity’s 
revenue-generating potential. These universities fairly might be 
regarded as willing to enforce their patent rights on principle. 
While most such universities are unlikely to have policies to guide 
their involvement in patent infringement litigation, they have given 
the issue substantial thought and thus feel prepared to pursue 
infringers when warranted.  
2. The Majority Approach: Reluctant Pursuers and 
Contingent Participants 
Most universities that litigate patents are conflicted about 
the activity. For these universities, a potential defendant’s identity, 
low projected monetary returns, and high legal costs may dampen 
their enthusiasm for pursuing an infringement action. These 
universities are likely to see the activity as ancillary to, or even in 
direct conflict with, their mission as a research university, which 
causes them to be exceedingly cautious and reluctant actors when 
issues of infringement arise. Concerns for how others will view 
their involvement as plaintiffs in patent infringement litigation may 
hamper these universities’ ability to effectively pursue the activity 
when the facts otherwise support their participation. Unwilling to 
take a uniformly strong stance against all infringers, the majority 
of universities that litigate patents are erratic in their decisions 
concerning patent enforcement, often hinging their approaches to 





III. CHANGING POLICY: TOWARD A COHERENT POSITION ON 
UNIVERSITY PATENT OWNERSHIP AND ENFORCEMENT  
The findings from the study reported in this Article provide 
empirical support for several policy recommendations that could 
help further university enforcement of patents in the public 
interest. One way to reconcile the legal/policy tensions identified 
in Parts I and II is to adapt university cultures, dispositions, and 
decisional infrastructures concerning patent enforcement to better 
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align with restrictive requirements imposed by patent law. This 
Part describes how. 
A. Reframing University Understanding of Patents 
Today’s universities face a financing crisis. Increasingly 
the victims of diminishing and highly volatile state support, 
institutions of higher education must seek additional sources of 
funding to support their operations. Many see this paradigm as the 
“new normal” of higher education finance.
130
 As the influential and 
well-known president of Ohio State University, E. Gordon Gee, 
recently argued, universities “must seek fundamentally new ways 
to fund our core purposes”
131
 —not as a strategy for weathering a 
temporary recession, but rather out of necessity for sustaining 
activities and furthering excellence into the future. As a starting 
point, he suggests “finding innovative ways to leverage the 
market” and “commercializing technological innovations.”
132
 
The study described in this Article reveals why Gee and 
other university leaders who share his financial prognosis might 
view increasing patent licensing revenue as an essential way to 
diversify revenue streams. In turn, they also might see the initiation 
of subsequent patent infringement litigation as an acceptable 
method of simultaneously protecting patents and licensees, 
supporting research, leveraging the market, and commercializing 
technological innovations.  
However, as this study’s findings show, many universities 
that litigate patents do not yet know how to fit patent infringement 
litigation within their stated missions, perhaps because they view 
the activity as too infrequent or too ancillary to core pursuits to 
warrant much critical analysis. University technology transfer 
efforts historically have been directed to the confined and easily 
quantified concepts of patenting and licensing.
133
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 See DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: 
UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE 
BAYH-DOLE ACT IN THE UNITED STATES 84 (2004) (describing the historical 
primacy of these metrics in evaluating the success of technology transfer). 
Indeed, the metrics on which technology transfer has been built and judged by 
AUTM and others focus predominantly on matters pertaining to patenting (e.g., 
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But as institutional goals such as cultivating innovation 
ecosystems, commercialization, and entrepreneurship replace first-
generation constructions of technology transfer as predominantly 
focused on patenting and licensing,
134
 so might institutional 
attitudes and cultures evolve to better accommodate patent 
enforcement activity. Instead of viewing patent infringement 
litigation as a source of conflict, embarrassment, or even shame 
(i.e., a breakdown of a TTO’s core patenting and licensing 
activities), the activity stands ripe for reconstruction as an integral 
part of the university’s expanding commitment to fostering 
innovation, spurring commercialization, and reflecting institutional 
entrepreneurship. These three loosely defined concepts—very 
much in vogue among university administrators and technology 
transfer professionals—each have room to embrace an activity that 
many within and outside the university traditionally have viewed 
in a puzzled, if not negative, light. 
Increasingly seen as significant agents of economic 
development and instruments of national wealth creation,
135
 
universities of the future are unlikely to be halting in their 
approaches to patent enforcement, as many of them are today. 
Policymakers and entrepreneurial faculty will not permit them such 
indecision. What some currently may view as an uncomfortable 
truth about universities that litigate patents—that relationships with 
industry and concerns related to revenue drive the majority of 
university decisions involving patent enforcement—stands to 
become an accepted and even celebrated reality, evidence of an 
entrepreneurial university’s commitment to develop state and 
regional economies through fierce protection of intellectual 
property. While never likely to turn into the preferred mode of 
                                                                                                             
and licensing (e.g., the number of exclusive licenses executed, the number of 
options executed, etc.). See, e.g., Gary Rhoades, Housing the Measurement of 
University Innovations’ Social Value: Organizational Site, Professional 
Perspective, Institutional Outlook, in ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION & ECONOMIC GROWTH 237, 237-67 (2009). 
Of course, other metrics are given some consideration. In particular, the number 
of new companies formed and jobs created through technology transfer are 
being discussed. This emphasis likely only will grow in importance as 
policymakers place more attention on the capacity of university research to drive 
economic development. 
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licensing to spurring entrepreneurial behavior). 
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TTO operation, unabashed and unapologetic patent enforcement 
could soon be championed as an important tool among others for 
universities seeking to commercialize technologies as they strive to 
accommodate new financing and economic development 
imperatives. In short, what I describe as the minority approach to 
patent enforcement (i.e., universities as “willing pursuers and 
prepared participants”) could become the majority approach as 
universities continue their reorientation of priorities and 
allegiances.  
 Mounting economic pressures cast doubt on any optimism 
for a decrease in university participation as plaintiffs in patent 
infringement litigation in years to come. Most likely the 
traditional—and some have argued elitist
136
—conception of 
universities as socially detached and disinterested bastions of 
general and specialized knowledge increasingly will be 
supplemented or even wholly supplanted with a conception of the 
American research university as firmly market-situated by design. 
Many signs indicate that such reconstruction of the modern 
research university is well underway. No longer indifferent to the 
concerns of society’s markets, the socially embedded modern 
university is very much a part of them.
137
 With respect to state-
funded universities, gone are the days of automatic earmarks with 
wide deference given by the state to university spending priorities. 
Public financial support of higher education as a percentage of 
total operating budgets is unlikely to return to pre-2000 levels.
138
 
Indeed, such support is shifting and will continue to flow only in 
exchange for specific commitments and undertakings, most of 
them market-driven. Progressively more private donors as well are 
no longer content to make substantial unrestricted donations to 
university endowments, which many view as “lazy money.”
139
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Instead, many of the wealthiest of donors demand active use of 
their largesse through the creation of interdisciplinary ventures and 
private sector collaborations that marshal resources and expertise 
toward confronting any number of difficult problems facing 
society.  
While widespread knowledge dissemination is still a 
university mission, and will be into the future, universities can no 
longer pursue that mission without fastidious regard for cost and 
the increasingly proprietary nature of knowledge.
140
 These 
concerns simultaneously are changing the guiding philosophy of 
technology transfer from one of university-centered technology 
push to industry-driven market pull, a natural outgrowth of 
research universities seeking to “increase the presence of industries 
on campus.”
141
 Enticing industry with more favorable licensing 
terms while reducing encumbrances to their ownership of 
patents,
142
 launching new degree programs to provide “the kind of 
education industry is seeking,”
143
 and constructing and updating 
buildings in which companies can set up research wings on 
campus
144
 are just a few of the many ways in which universities 
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Even the phrase technology transfer—which to some 
harkens an outdated image of tripartite, arms-length relations 
between government, academia, and industry—is gradually 
becoming passé as universities seek to brand their TTOs and 
research activities as firmly situated in the market.
146
 
Entrepreneurialism, job creation, revenue generation, interwoven 
industry collaborations, market consciousness, and market-facing, 
self-sustaining university endeavors are the selling points of the 
reconstructed research university. These attributes and pressures 
may soon make university hesitancy to litigate patents seem not 
only unreasonable from the standpoint of protecting the patent 
premium, but quaint and outmoded from the perspective of the 
university’s changing priorities. The new model requires 
universities to innovate and differentiate in order to survive in their 
developing role as comprehensive knowledge enterprises.
147
 In 
light of these prevailing forces, increased incidence of university 
initiation of patent infringement litigation may come to be 
described as an accepted externality of society’s new expectations 
from higher education—a “necessary evil,” as one of my study’s 
interviewees put it. 
In view of these forces and pending realities, universities 
must begin to reframe their understanding of patents should they 
wish to fully engage as market-facing enterprises in the changing 
paradigm of higher education finance. Universities’ Cold War 
approach of stockpiling patents in the hopes that licensees will 
come calling (while would-be infringers retreat) is rightfully on the 
decline. In the reconstructed university, meaningful accolades are 
unlikely to flow to institutions based substantially on how 
successful they are in obtaining and accumulating patents. While 
patents always will serve as useful proxies for research 
achievement and bring commendation to universities successful in 
obtaining them, the more significant industry attention and desired 
research investment will go to those universities savvy enough to 
know how best to use their patents to further the commercial goals 
of their industry partners. Furthering those goals necessarily 
requires universities to acknowledge unequivocally what a patent 
is: authorization to sue for infringement. 
                                                 
146
 The recently reformulated names of Columbia University’s, Arizona State 
University’s, University of New Mexico’s, University of Nebraska’s, and 
University of Arkansas-Fayetteville’s TTOs are emblematic of this shift: 
Columbia Technology Ventures, AzTE, STC.UNM, NUtech Ventures, and 
Technology Ventures, respectively. See http://www.techventures.columbia.edu/, 
http://www.azte.com/, https://stc.unm.edu/, http://www.nutechventures.org/, & 
http://techventures.uark.edu/ for more information. 
147
 See Crow, supra note 136, at 65. 
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At first glance, university hesitancy to litigate patents is 
understandable, given the costs and reputational risks associated 
with the activity. Indeed, universities are not alone in exhibiting 
this tendency.
148
 But universities must confront this hesitancy if 
they wish to become rational owners and enforcers of patents—in 
short, attractive partners to the companies whose favor and 
research support they increasingly curry.  
Rational patent owners understand that patents are limited 
monopolies to exclude and government-granted rights to sue.
149
 
Limited monopolies have no value unless owners of them seek to 
enforce the monopolies. For university patent owners, historical 
focus has been on exploiting their patent monopolies through 
licensing.
150
 This approach is preferable for university patent 
owners and should continue. However, rational patent owners 
understand that a patent license is built on the implicit promise not 
to sue for infringement.
151
 If the owner of a patent declines to 
project that the failure to take a license to its patent will result in an 
infringement lawsuit, the owner’s patent is nothing more than a 
valueless piece of paper, despite all the financial and institutional 
investments into research that it represents.  
Universities must come to embrace these understandings of 
patents and their place in the changing marketplace of higher 
education finance. Anything less may result in deepening tension 
for universities between their mandate to innovate and their 
compulsion to litigate.  
B. Inconsiderate Positions on Enforcement: What 
Universities Don’t Do Can Hurt Them 
While some universities are rational patent owners and 
enforcers, findings from the study reported in this article show that 
many are not. Unfortunately, universities’ disinclinations to 
enforce their patents through infringement litigation only serve to 
undermine their research missions in several important ways.  
                                                 
148
 See PATENT LITIGATION STRATEGIES HANDBOOK, supra note 129, at 6 
(noting that “many businesses are averse to litigation, except in the most 
compelling of circumstances”). 
149
 See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: 
HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND 
PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004). 
150
 See MOWERY ET AL., supra note 133, at 35-57 (providing historical overview 
of university patent practices in the United States prior to 1980). 
151
 James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from 
Empirical Research on Patent Litigation, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 199 (Peter 
K. Yu ed., 2007); Poltorak, supra note 69, at 18, 23; Ted Sichelman & Stuart 
J.H. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study, 17 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 111, 118-19 (2010). 
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First, universities that are ambivalent about enforcing their 
patents waste valuable resources that have been invested into 
research and patenting. A patent issued to a university represents 
years of costly research investment by taxpayers and faculty, and 
thousands of dollars of human capital by the university’s TTO and 
patent counsel. Failure to enforce the patent in court when 
warranted undermines the commercialization system in which 
universities have decided to play. If universities are uncomfortable 
defending their patent rights through assertive litigation then they 
should stop seeking patents. As a respondent interviewed in the 
study reported in this Article noted, “If a university’s research 
mission is to disseminate technological advances, dissemination 
requires investment, which requires return, which requires 
protection. If you’re not willing to protect technology, that stance 
inhibits its dissemination more broadly and more generally.” 
Second, universities that are ambivalent about enforcing 
their patents only undermine their own attempts to establish 
productive commercial relationships and license other patents in 
ways that generate revenue for the university. A university’s 
failure to enforce one patent when warranted sends a signal to 
industry that it may not be willing to enforce other patents it owns. 
Many - if not most - companies will feel no obligation to take a 
license to a university’s patent when they perceive no consequence 
for declining to take a license. As Howard Bremer, one of the 
architects of the Bayh-Dole Act, has remarked, “Universities are 
generally not inclined to litigate. . . . A lot of private sector 
companies, the big ones, look at universities as toothless tigers, 
because they are not going to assert their patent rights.”
152
 If 
universities expect to generate revenues through their patents (i.e., 
behave like tigers), they must be willing to bare their teeth. A 
respondent interviewed in the study reported in this Article voiced 
this concern quite succinctly with the comment, “If it got out that 
we exclusively licensed a technology to a company, and were not 
willing to stand behind that technology in a patent enforcement 




Third, universities that are ambivalent about enforcing their 
patents jeopardize their relationships with faculty inventors, on 
whom they depend for invention disclosures that can lead to 
patents. Faculty inventors understand the technology transfer 
system and the recognition and riches it can bring them.
154
 
Universities owe it to these faculty members to enforce the patents 
whose ownership they enjoy through institutional policies that 
                                                 
152
 Rooksby, supra note 52, at 172. 
153
 Rooksby, supra note 1, at 156. 
154
 See SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 49, at 113-29. 
49
Rooksby: INNOVATION AND LITIGATION
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
INNOVATION AND LITIGATION: TENSIONS BETWEEN UNIVERSITIES 
AND PATENTS AND HOW TO FIX THEM 
361 
 
require faculty inventors to assign their inventions to the 
university.
155
 A university’s consistent timorousness with respect 
to patent enforcement could cause faculty inventors to lose faith in 
their employer’s ability to monetize their inventions, ultimately 
leading to a decrease in invention disclosures and the departure of 




In short, findings from the study reported in this Article 
allow for a convincing argument that institutions waste time, 
money, and other resources amassing expensive patent portfolios 
that they are not willing to defend categorically. Just as universities 
do not tolerate flagrant defacement or disregard of their real 
property without recompense, and in fact take steps to deter such 
activity, they also must be willing to pursue those that infringe 
their intangible property. Their relationships with industry, 
including any hopes they have of being seen as heeding innovation 
and commercialization mandates, will suffer if they do not.  
C. Develop Decisional Infrastructures Concerning Patent 
Enforcement 
Universities famously have policies or guidelines that cover 
almost every activity in which they engage. However, as findings 
from the study reported in this Article reveal, few universities that 
litigate patents have policies or guidelines concerning their 
participation as plaintiffs in patent infringement litigation, and only 
one indicated that it budgets for the activity. At the same time, 
decision-makers at most of the surveyed universities believe that it 
                                                 
155
 Margaret T. Stopp & G. Harry Stopp, Jr., The Enforcement of University 
Patent Policies: A Legal Perspective, 24 J. RES. ADMIN. 5 (1992) (describing 
how institutional intellectual property policies often require faculty to assign 
ownership of any patentable discovery made during the course of their 
employment to their university employer). 
156
 Incidentally, these potential consequences provide support for the open 
source or faculty free agency model of technology transfer advocated for by the 
Kauffman Foundation and others, whereby inventor faculty dissatisfied with 
how their university chooses to commercialize and enforce the patents it owns 
could elect to use a different university’s TTO to commercialize their 
inventions. See Robert E. Litan & Robert Cook-Deegan, Universities and 
Economic Growth: The Importance of Academic Entrepreneurship, in RULES 
FOR GROWTH: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND GROWTH THROUGH LEGAL 
REFORM 55, 55-82 (2011); see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON JOBS AND 
COMPETITIVENESS, TAKING ACTION, BUILDING CONFIDENCE: FIVE COMMON-
SENSE INITIATIVES TO BOOST JOBS AND COMPETITIVENESS (2011) (endorsing 
faculty free agency); Press Release, Sen. Jerry Moran, Sens. Moran and Warner 
Offer Bipartisan Job Creation Plan (Dec. 8, 2011), available at 
http://moran.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2011/12/sens-moran-and-warner-offer 
(proposing funding for universities that allow faculty free agency). I take no 
position here on the merits of the free agency proposal. 
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is inevitable that their university will serve as a plaintiff in a patent 
infringement lawsuit again in the future. These findings, coupled 
with most universities’ ambivalent stance on patent enforcement, 
suggest an opportunity for universities to develop appropriate 
decisional infrastructures that could encourage their thinking about 
potential involvement as plaintiffs in patent infringement litigation.  
1. Benefits 
In order to be better prepared for pursuing patent infringers 
when warranted, and to facilitate more thoughtful institutional 
planning and decision-making about the activity, universities 
should develop decisional infrastructures concerning assertive 
involvement in patent infringement litigation.
157
 The precise form 
and formality of such infrastructures would vary depending on the 
needs and culture of a particular university, but a respected 
membership group like AUTM could help influence this discussion 
by providing guidelines that would lead to the development of 
industry norms. At a minimum, such infrastructures should entail 
careful elaboration and stakeholder consensus concerning why 
enforcement litigation is occasionally necessary, identification of 
the appropriate chain-of-command structure and key decision-
makers to be involved in any decision to sue for patent 
infringement, and articulation of the non-exhaustive factors the 
university should consider and actions it should consider taking 
before embarking on any enforcement action.  
As part of this undertaking, universities should establish 
plans for budgeting for patent infringement litigation—for 
example, by setting aside X% of university patent royalties each 
year into a reserve fund only to be used for funding patent 
infringement litigation. Budgeting for patent infringement 
litigation necessarily would require that universities proactively 
consider a range of issues affecting litigation finances, many of 
which could be considered in the development of a decisional 
infrastructure. As one interviewee from the study reported in this 
Article pointed out, a policy decision to set aside a portion of 
licensing revenue for use in potential pursuit of patent 
infringement litigation necessarily entails having less money to 
allocate toward other routine budgetary line items, such as filing 
patent applications. While true, this fact is insufficient reason not 
to allocate the money. Universities and other complex 
organizations commonly view certain expenditures as essential, 
regardless of their impact on cash flow. Just as a university is 
unlikely to regard the yearly purchase of liability insurance as 
                                                 
157
 Cf. LEE G. BOLMAN & TERRENCE E. DEAL, REFRAMING ORGANIZATIONS: 
ARTISTRY, CHOICE, AND LEADERSHIP (4th ed. 2008). 
51
Rooksby: INNOVATION AND LITIGATION
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
INNOVATION AND LITIGATION: TENSIONS BETWEEN UNIVERSITIES 
AND PATENTS AND HOW TO FIX THEM 
363 
 
optional, the yearly set-aside of X% of university patent royalties 
for use in potential pursuit of patent infringement litigation could 
come to be viewed as obligatory, and should. 
Decisional infrastructures concerning patent infringement 
litigation could also help improve universities’ relationships with 
current and prospective licensees, as well as serving to strengthen 
their image with any would-be infringers in industry. Current and 
prospective licensees might regard a university’s proactive 
thoughtfulness concerning patent infringement litigation as 
additional indication that the university is adequately prepared to 
join in litigation with a licensee if necessary. A university’s 
cultural understanding that patent ownership occasionally may 
involve patent enforcement through litigation could convey an 
important signal to companies interested not just in licensing a 
given technology, but in teaming with an adroit university partner. 
Given a choice between partnering with a university perceived as 
prepared to engage in patent infringement litigation if appropriate 
and one whose level of thoughtfulness concerning the activity can 
only be speculated, a conscientious company might prefer the 
former. For universities, developing decisional infrastructures 
concerning patent infringement litigation might also send an 
important message to companies considering using technologies 
covered by university patents without licensing them—i.e., that the 
university is strategically and internally prepared to pursue 
infringers if necessary. 
Of course, decisional infrastructures of the sort envisioned 
should not be seen as a threat, nor would attempting to wield them 
as such be effective or advisable. Private universities in particular 
may have other ways of instilling fear in would-be infringers, to 
the extent they wish to do so. As one of the interviewees from the 
study reported in this Article commented: 
 
We do use subtle threats. If I get a really 
recalcitrant guy, I say to him, “Hey pal, do 
you really want the full wrath of [our 
university] to come down on you? Do you 
want to be the guy to be sued by [our 
university] because you stole stuff from us? 
Do you know how many resources we have? 
Do you know how big we are? Do you know 
who our general counsel is?” You use things 
like that when you try to convince people 
that it would not be in their best interest to 
[force us to litigate].
158
  
                                                 
158
 Rooksby, supra note 1, at 195. 
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In addition to these threats, this same interviewee mentioned that 
the interviewee’s university has a “hard and fast rule”: “[I]f you 
screw [our university], you never, ever again can do any business 
with [us]. You go on a list, and you can never, ever again do 




Finally, cultivating decisional infrastructures concerning 
patent infringement litigation also would provide the opportunity 
for universities to consider proactively the litigation-related 
language contained in their licensing agreements. While the 
content of such agreements varies widely, some have suggested 
that licensing terms often are silent on key issues concerning 
infringement litigation, or even contain provisions that are 
inconsistent with requirements imposed by patent law.
160
 It would 
seem prudent for universities to implement standard language 
about patent infringement litigation to use in their licensing 
agreements as part of their institutional development of appropriate 
frameworks and modalities concerning the activity. Such language 
could include the process by which agreements will be reached 
concerning whether to litigate; the process by which outside 
counsel will be selected and supervised; details concerning 
responsibilities for payment of litigation fees and costs, as well as 
how proceeds from settlements or damages awards will be 
distributed; and what assistance or other resources the university 
will provide to its licensee in any patent infringement lawsuit 
brought in conjunction with the licensee. While some universities 
already may have adopted standardized language to address these 
issues, many undoubtedly have not. 
2. Arguments Against Developing Decisional 
Infrastructures Concerning Patent Infringement 
Litigation Are Inapposite  
Some may argue that establishing institutional policies on 
patent infringement litigation would not be a helpful undertaking, 
on the belief that universities’ lack of policies, guidelines, and 
budgetary set-asides for patent infringement litigation do not 
indicate that universities are insufficiently prepared to engage in 
the activity when warranted. Indeed, interviewees cited the 
idiosyncratic, fact-specific nature of litigation, as well as their 
belief that university general counsel offices typically do not have 
policies on when to engage in any other variety of litigation, as 
reasons for maintaining the status quo.  




 See Newton, supra note 16, at 235-54. 
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These arguments overlook several important 
considerations. For one, many universities may not have developed 
mature decisional infrastructures concerning their assertive 
engagement in garden-variety litigation (e.g., breach of contract 
actions) because the instances of such litigation, as well as the 
institution’s reputational and financial stakes in such litigation 
when it does occur, typically are de minimis. By comparison, 
future assertive involvement in patent infringement litigation is a 
near certainty for most of the universities in my study’s population, 
and any such involvement brings with it significant reputational 
and financial risks. Development of the decisional infrastructures 
advocated here could help universities prepare for these risks and 
approach all decisions whether to litigate patents in an informed 
and systematic fashion. 
Also misplaced is the assumption that any organized 
thinking on patent infringement litigation necessarily would result 
in a stifling policy that would risk committing universities to 
predetermined courses of action without accounting for the 
particular facts at hand. To the contrary, to be useful and effective, 
decisional infrastructures concerning patent enforcement should 
not lead to the creation of guidelines aimed at predicting behavior 
or committing the university to future action (e.g., “We always will 
sue for patent infringement in the following situations: . . .”). 
Instead, decisional infrastructures would advance institutional 
thinking concerning patent infringement litigation by establishing 
frameworks and modalities that could increase the chances that 
university decisions to litigate or not litigate are fully informed by 
all appropriate factors and relevant viewpoints. 
3. Summary 
When events are rare or perceived as rare, decision-makers 
may feel less urgency to plan for them.
161
 For many universities, 
patent enforcement may be perceived from the standpoint of rarity 
and the inability to plan, despite what data from the study reported 
in this Article indicate concerning universities’ likely future 
involvement in the activity, and despite the same set of broad 
factors and considerations potentially relevant to any university 
plaintiff in any patent infringement lawsuit. Just as universities 
seldom resist developing decisional infrastructures to help frame 
institutional responses to unanticipated but likely occurrences 
affecting their human capital and real property (e.g., student 
suicides, natural disasters, and other threats to campus safety), so, 
too, should they consider preparing themselves for crises involving 
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 See James G. March, Lee S. Sproull & Michal Tamuz, Learning from 
Samples of One or Fewer, 2 ORG. SCI. 1 (1991). 
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their intangible property. Developing decisional infrastructures 
concerning patent infringement litigation would not end university 
involvement in the activity; rather, such infrastructures would 
facilitate thoughtful and prepared decision-making by universities 
when faced with an infringer. 
IV. CHANGING LAW: LET UNIVERSITIES INNOVATE WHILE 
LICENSEES LITIGATE  
Findings from the study reported in this Article, when 
viewed in light of the CAFC’s prudential standing requirement for 
owners of exclusively licensed patents, illuminate the legal and 
policy tensions universities face when confronted with infringers 
of their patents. An additional method of reconciling these 
tensions—instead of or in conjunction with the policy changes 
proposed in Part III above, and likely of more appeal to 
universities whose TTO operations are less established—involves 
amending the Patent Act so as to permit universities more freedom 
to innovate instead of forcing them to litigate. This Part describes 
how. 
A. Why Legislative Action Is Needed 
The CAFC’s rationale for its prudential standing 
requirement in cases involving exclusively licensed patents lacks 
justification when applied to university patent owners. Universities 
are unlikely entities to seek out enforcement opportunities, and 
indeed, findings from the study reported in this Article show that 
most are reluctant participants in infringement lawsuits. 
Universities primarily are in the business of innovating, not 
litigating, and most would like to keep it that way.  
But under prevailing CAFC interpretation of patent law, 
universities often have no choice but to litigate.
162
 As discussed 
                                                 
162
 It is important to note that, for a variety of reasons, university patent owners 
are not always made co-plaintiffs in enforcement actions, either at the outset of 
the case, or ever. Some university TTO personnel, university licensees, and their 
counsel may be unaware of the prudential standing requirement. Also, because it 
does not lead to automatic dismissal of the case  and because most cases settle 
early in the life cycle of a lawsuit, conceivably a university and its licensee 
reasonably could decide to leave the university out of the lawsuit until the court 
orders its inclusion (or hope that the case settles before anyone raises the issue). 
See PATENT LITIGATION STRATEGIES HANDBOOK, supra note 129, at 168. Of 
course, some opposing parties fail to raise the issue in a timely manner, so a case 
may proceed after filing without the university patent owner as plaintiff. Even 
for those cases that do proceed, some federal district court judges may fail to 
raise the issue on their own if one of the parties does not. Indeed, many of these 
scenarios appear to have played out in the AsymmetRx case (discussed supra 
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earlier in this Article, this unfortunate necessity is problematic for 
many universities. Whenever a university joins a lawsuit with a 
licensee co-plaintiff (either at the outset of the case, or later, 
whether by decision or compulsion), issues surrounding the 
university’s involvement may strain the university-licensee 
relationship, as each party’s goals and ideas about how best to 
pursue the lawsuit may differ as the case develops.
163
 The 
university’s involvement in such litigation may impact the 
university in other noticeable ways as well. Patent infringement 
litigation is a costly undertaking for any party,
164
 even for 
universities that are paying only a portion of the total cost, whether 
out-of-pocket or set-off against future royalties. The activity also 
has a tendency to drain TTO productivity
165
 and, as findings from 
the study reported in this Article indicate, often brings with it 
delicate political issues that can impact university relationships 
with important funders or supporters (whether public or private), 
not to mention damage the public’s image of universities as 
purveyors of undifferentiated knowledge.
166
 
For at least these reasons, serious consideration should be 
given to the potential for Congressional action that would allow 
universities to continue to enjoy the upsides of patent ownership 
(i.e., licensing revenues) without the pronounced downside of 
occasionally having to assertively pursue infringers in court.
167
 
                                                                                                             
Part I), where the CAFC raised the prudential standing requirement sua sponte 
on appeal. 
163
 Universities typically are highly risk-averse entities, so a licensee in a given 
lawsuit with a university co-plaintiff may have more tolerance than the 
university for pursuing a lawsuit past the initial stages of pleadings and 
discovery. Also, licensees have more to gain financially through lawsuits than 
do university patent-owners, and for that reason alone their orientation to any 
litigated dispute is likely to differ from that of universities.  
164
 See supra note 3 (discussing AIPLA data on litigation costs).  
165
 See Shane & Somaya, supra note 4.  
166
 While respondents in the study summarized in Part II did not report being 
driven by concern for the public’s reaction to their university’s potential 
involvement in assertive patent litigation, these data do not mean that others 
within or outside universities are not concerned by the activity. Indeed, the 
commentators cited in Subsection I.C.1 suggest that such concern abounds.   
167
 My proposal in many ways picks up where the CAFC leaves off. Unwilling 
to loosen the strictures of patent law as they apply to universities, the CAFC, as 
early as 1987, noted efforts by at least one prominent university (Cornell) “to 
have its cake and eat it too, i.e., to act in a noncommercial manner and yet 
preserve the pecuniary rewards of commercial exploitation for itself.” Griffith v. 
Kanamaru, 816 F.2d 624, 628 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (declining Cornell’s invitation to 
relax CAFC requirements for diligence in reducing to practice due to 
peculiarities of the university research environment). Professor Lee views this 
tension as part of a mounting rejection by patent courts of academic 
exceptionalism. See Lee, supra note 49, at 39 (“Whereas uniquely ‘academic’ 
norms, practices, and policies justified exceptional treatment of universities in 
earlier generations, modern courts view universities as much more akin to 
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That most universities defer substantially to the opinions of their 
licensees concerning litigation—often expecting them to pay some 
or all of the university’s legal costs in pursuing such actions, as 
found in the study reported in this Article—only further supports 
this proposal. Even more importantly for society, the proposal is 
consistent with a growing conception of patent law as public law 
and a concern for the collective hazards of the rising incidence of 
patent litigation, particularly when it involves universities.
168
  
B. Proposal for Amending the Patent Act 
Legislative change to the Patent Act could offer universities 
a way out of assertive infringement litigation without upsetting 
other important balances struck in the technology transfer system. 
Under my proposal, in exchange for ceding enforcement authority 
to their exclusive patent licensees, universities would not be 
required to join as plaintiffs in infringement actions involving 
those patents. If a university declined to join its exclusive licensee 
in a given lawsuit against a given defendant, the university would 
be prohibited from suing the same defendant for the same alleged 
act of patent infringement at a later time. Universities would retain 
the option to join infringement lawsuits brought by their exclusive 
licensees, but avoid the obligation. 
Section 281 of the Patent Act, which concerns “remedy for 
infringement of patent,” would be the logical section of the Patent 
Act in which to codify my proposal. The language of the proposal 
could follow the existing text, with the additions indicated below 
in italics: 
 
A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for 
infringement of his patent, provided: 
 
(1) No university shall be made to assert a 
patent it owns, in whole or in part, if that 
university files with the court on the day any 
infringement allegation is brought by a 
licensee or co-owner concerning the patent 
an affidavit that states for each such patent:  
                                                                                                             
commercial entities.”); id. at 40 (“[C]ontemporary courts have routinely rejected 
academic exceptionalism. In so doing, courts have relied on (and reinforced) a 
conception of universities as integrated into the traditional commercial narrative 
of patents.”). 
168
 See Feldman, supra note 55, at 2, 88 (noting “the locus of creative thought, 
all too often, has shifted from the R&D department to the legal department” and 
that society’s creative resources are moving “from building a better mousetrap 
and towards building better legal traps”); La Belle, supra note 8, at 50 (noting 
that the purpose of the patent system is public-serving in nature). 
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(A) that the university has ceded all 
past, present, and future enforcement 
control over the patent to the licensee or co-
owner, and  
(B) that the university releases from 
liability any party that the licensee or co-
owner has accused or may accuse of 
infringement in the present action, and will 
not seek civil remedy for infringement from 
any such party or parties in any action for 
any past, present, or future acts of 
infringement of the patent asserted in the 
pending lawsuit.  
(2) Nothing in this provision shall be 
deemed to provide standing to sue for 
infringement of a patent to a bare or non-
exclusive licensee. 
(3) For purposes of this provision, 
“university” shall mean an institution of 
higher education as defined in section 
101(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 
(20 U.S.C. 1001(a)), or a technology 
transfer organization whose primary 
purpose is to facilitate the 
commercialization of technologies 
developed by one or more such institutions 
of higher education. 
  
Various portions of the proposed statutory language merit 
elaboration. First, the language is flexible enough to recognize the 
complex realities of patent litigation—for example, that 
universities often co-own patents (with the federal government, 
other universities, or for-profit companies), that multiple patents 
often are asserted in litigation (often at different times in the 
litigation), that additional defendants can be added later on in 
litigation, and that allegations of infringement can be levied as 
counterclaims by defendants. Second, the proposed language 
breaks no new ground in its definition of a university. Indeed, 
paragraph 3 of the proposed amendment to Section 281 mimics the 
language in the Patent Act (as amended in 2011 by the Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act) that provides an exception to 
universities to the prior user rights defense.
169
 Third, the proposed 
                                                 
169
 See 35 U.S.C. § 273(e)(5)(A) (2006). In this sense, the proposed law would 
not be the first to offer universities a privileged position in patent litigation. See 
Arti K. Rai & Bhaven N. Sampat, Accountability in Patenting of Federally 
Funded Research, 30 NATURE BIOTECH. 953, 953 (2012) (noting that the 
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language does nothing to unsettle the CAFC’s or the Supreme 
Court’s longstanding recognition that non-exclusive licensees lack 
standing to sue for patent infringement. Thus, the proposed 
statutory amendment in paragraph 2 would not absolve universities 
of the obligation to participate as plaintiffs in lawsuits against 
parties they believe to have infringed a patent they have licensed 
non-exclusively (or not licensed at all).  
 Fairness considerations also are not upset by the statutory 
proposal. Importantly, the proposed amendment neither promotes 
nor disrupts a university’s ownership interest in its patents. Under 
the proposed amendment, a determination in a lawsuit that one or 
more claims of a litigated patent are invalid would have the same 
effect on the university as owner of the patent as it does now under 
prevailing law.
170
 Should the university ever attempt to assert the 
invalidated claims against the same or a different defendant in a 
new lawsuit, collateral estoppel would apply.
171
  
Further to the concern for fairness, by requiring that 
universities file an affidavit with the court on the day any 
infringement allegation is waged by a licensee or co-owner, 
adverse parties (be they defendants or plaintiffs) effectively would 
be put on notice at the outset of the case of a university’s decision 
not to participate in the enforcement proceeding. Thus, in order to 
take advantage of the provisions of the proposed amendment, 
universities would have to act quickly. Those that do not would be 
prevented from taking advantage of the amended statute and could 
be compelled to join the case if they are otherwise not already a 
party to it.
172
   
                                                                                                             
exception to prior user rights affords universities and their assignees and/or 
licensees a privileged position in patent infringement litigation). 
170
 However, Section IV.D, infra, discusses the potential limitations to having a 
university not participate—at least as a named party—in a lawsuit concerning 
the validity of one or more of its patents. 
171
 While law on the matter varies by appellate circuit, collateral estoppel 
typically applies when there is a showing that: 
(1) the issue at stake was identical to the one involved in the 
prior litigation; (2) the issue had been actually litigated in the 
prior suit; (3) the determination of the issue in the prior 
litigation was a critical and necessary part of the judgment in 
that action; and (4) the party against whom the earlier decision 
is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue 
in the earlier proceeding.  
Bayer AG v. Biovail Corp., 279 F.3d 1340, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting In re 
McWhorter, 887 F.2d 1564, 1566 (11th Cir. 1989)) (applying Eleventh Circuit 
law). The application of these factors would prevent a university from asserting 
claims of a patent previously held invalid in federal court litigation. 
172
 Occasionally, a licensee may allege infringement of a university-owned 
patent without the university’s knowledge. In such situations, the university 
taken by surprise by its licensee’s action might be unable to timely file the 
affidavit, and therefore be unable to take advantage of the proposed statutory 
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The statutory proposal also would help conserve judicial 
resources. By offering universities an early exit from patent 
litigation, parties would be relieved of the discovery burdens and 
motions disputes associated with determining whether a university 
owns substantial rights to an asserted patent, such that its 
involvement in the case is legally required. Freed from these 
evidentiary and legal inquiries, courts and litigants would be able 
to more quickly and efficiently address the core issue of any patent 
infringement case: whether the asserted patent or patents are valid 
and have been infringed.  
Finally, it bears noting that the language of the proposal 
does not address the “all substantial rights” inquiry that is central 
to the underlying question of whether a given university must 
participate in asserting infringement of its patent. Importantly, it 
need not do so. As written, the proposed statutory amendment 
would accommodate the scenario where a university owns 
substantial rights to its exclusively licensed patent, as well as the 
scenario where an exclusive licensee owns all substantial rights to 
the patent (in which case the university effectively has assigned the 
patent). In either scenario, the concerns that given rise to the 
CAFC’s prudential standing requirement would be muted by a 
university’s filing of the affidavit—i.e., whether the CAFC would 
view the university as the patent owner becomes irrelevant once 
the university takes advantage of the statute’s provision.
173
  
C. Benefits to the Proposed Statutory Amendment  
The legislative proposal presented above recognizes several 
important premises. First, many universities—which, unlike for-
                                                                                                             
amendment. This possibility is no reason to discredit the proposed amendment, 
as it would leave the university in no worse of a legal position than it would 
otherwise confront under prevailing law. This hypothetical scenario also 
highlights one of the statutory proposal’s likely consequences: it may encourage 
improved communications between universities and licensees concerning issues 
of infringement litigation.  
173
 This feature of the proposal is also one of its strengths. Before a lawsuit is 
even filed, universities and their exclusive licensees could forego painstaking 
legal inquiry into whether their licensing agreements conveyed all, or less than 
all, substantial rights to the patent. Should the university decide it does not want 
to participate, and will take advantage of the proposed statutory amendment, it 
will not matter how the court would actually rule in determining who owns 
substantial rights to the patent. This is no trifling attribute, for as the cases 
reviewed supra in Subsection I.A.2 make clear, determining through litigation 
who enjoys substantial rights to the patent can consume significant litigant and 
judicial resources. Cf. Greene, supra note 9, at 29-30 (“The Federal Circuit’s 
decisions in this [‘all substantial rights’] line of cases tend toward semantic 
mush rather than functional or pragmatic analysis, which tends only to muddy 
the standard, confusing courts and litigants and injecting uncertainty into the 
litigation process.”). 
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profit companies, primarily owe allegiance to taxpayers when it 
comes to their research activities—do not want to litigate their 
patents, yet the CAFC’s imposition of a prudential standing 
requirement on owners of exclusively licensed patents effectively 
mandates their eventual involvement in patent infringement 
lawsuits, no different than it would any for-profit enterprise. 
Second, as a matter of policy, most universities are poorly suited to 
litigate their patents, no matter their motivation for doing so, and 
both universities (as owners and licensors of patents) and society 
(as funders of universities and university research activities) suffer 
as a result of this inefficiency. Third, shifting the legal burden of 
patent enforcement to exclusive licensees in most instances would 
do little to disrupt the current relationship between exclusive 
licensees and university patent owners with respect to patent 
infringement litigation.  
As the entities (other than universities) most affected by 
this proposal, exclusive licensees would have no legitimate 
grounds for rejecting it. Companies that license patents typically 
are more accustomed to assertive litigation than universities. 
Regardless of any actual past experience in court, commercial 
licensees as a sector are better situated—financially and 
strategically—to pursue litigation. The deference they currently 
receive from universities with respect to matters of patent 
infringement would in a sense be codified. University-owned 
patents still would be litigated, but without the mandated 
involvement of universities, which would be freed to pursue more 
classically defined activities that further their research missions. 
Those who might argue that the proposed statutory amendment 
would expose universities to risks with exclusive licensees running 
enforcement litigation would have difficulty establishing that such 
a future would differ substantially from the current reality, as 
revealed by the findings from the study reported in this Article. 
At its core, the legislative proposal would allow 
universities to enjoy the upside of patent ownership while limiting 
their involvement in one of the major downsides. Relieved of the 
expense and distraction of having to pursue infringers in court, 
universities could redouble their traditional research and 
commercialization efforts and focus more energy on their 
mandates to innovate. The proposal thus better aligns university 
activities with traditional societal expectations for university 
research. It also does so without compromising universities’ 
increasing focus on market partnerships or undermining their 
innovation mandates. In short, the proposal recognizes that letting 
exclusive licensees litigate while universities innovate better serves 
the public good. 
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D. Limitations to the Proposed Statutory Amendment 
Admittedly, the proposed statutory amendment only 
addresses those instances when a university is faced with joining 
an exclusive licensee (or co-owner) as co-plaintiff in bringing an 
enforcement action. It would not benefit a university in instances 
of infringement of patents the university either has not licensed or 
has licensed non-exclusively. However, as the research in 
Subsection I.C.3 of this Article reveals, instances of universities 
bringing suit as co-plaintiffs with their exclusive licensees 
represent the majority (n = 221, or 67.6%) of all patent 
infringement lawsuits brought by universities from 1973 through 
2012.  
 The limitation with respect to the proposal’s scope of 
application is also one of its strengths. If universities faced more 
freedom of choice as to whether to join an enforcement action 
brought in conjunction with an exclusive licensee, the nature of 
any university patent infringement action that gets brought after 
passage of the proposed amendment would be painted in high 
relief. Three scenarios seem possible: (1) the university, for 
whatever reason, deemed it preferable to participate as a plaintiff 
in an enforcement action with its exclusive licensee; (2) the 
university felt compelled to sue on its own—for example, because 
the alleged infringer refused to take a license to the university’s 
patent, or because the university licensed the patent non-
exclusively;
174
 or (3) the university decided to engage in assertion 
licensing, i.e., patent hold-up. Whatever the scenario, the rarity of 
the occasion likely would ensure that the university is prepared to 
defend its action in the court of public opinion. At the very least, 
any of these envisioned scenarios necessarily would result from a 
thoughtful and intentional university decision to litigate, not a 
capitulation to an exclusive licensee bullishly cognizant of the 
legal regime that compels university involvement in patent 
infringement lawsuits without regard for underlying motivations or 
aptitudes.  
 While not the intended effect of the proposal, universities 
could use the provisions of the proposed statutory amendment to 
mask speculative or troll-like enforcement by PAEs created 
specifically for the litigation, which obviously is an important and 
additional limitation. In a sense, the proposal could be seen as 
                                                 
174
 Non-exclusive licensees do not have standing to sue for patent infringement, 
whether by themselves or in conjunction with the patent owner. See Sicom Sys. 
Ltd., v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 427 F.3d 971, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“A 
nonexclusive license confers no constitutional standing on the licensee to bring 
suit or even to join a suit with the patentee because a nonexclusive licensee 
suffers no legal injury from infringement.”). 
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permissively encouraging an activity in which some universities 
already engage through assigning all substantial rights to a patent 
they own to a PAE created to enforce the patent.
175
 As with any 
PAE litigation, however, examining the nature of the entity 
alleging infringement would be revealing. Moreover, by filing a 
publicly viewable affidavit with a court, universities that use the 
proposed statutory amendment to effectively confirm their 
involvement with a PAE (their licensee) would not escape public 
scrutiny, and might even invite it. The same is not true for 
universities that currently traffic with PAEs by assigning all 
substantial patent rights to them. These deals typically escape 
detection in that the university undeniably no longer owns the 
patent the PAE asserts, so the nature of its beneficial interest in the 
outcome of the lawsuit is obscured.
176
  
Another of the proposal’s limitations is that it could lead to 
a marginal decrease in the licensing fees companies would be 
willing to accept from universities. From the perspective of 
exclusive licensees, the proposed statutory amendment would 
introduce a new element of uncertainty in their relationship with 
universities, as it would allow universities the freedom to decline 
to participate as a co-plaintiff in any enforcement action, both at 
the point of contracting and at the point an infringer is identified 
and the exclusive licensee prepares to sue. Exclusive licensees 
would be likely to view a university’s refusal to commit to a 
contract term requiring the university to participate as a plaintiff 
with the licensee in any enforcement action as tantamount to a 
decision at a future date, when a specific infringer is identified, not 
to participate. This reasonable assumption presumably would lead 
universities to receive a lower licensing fee than they would if their 
exclusive licensees enjoyed contractual assurances of university 
participation in any enforcement lawsuit. However, in exchange 
for these arguably lower returns, universities would gain a freedom 
of choice they do not currently enjoy under prevailing law.
177
   
                                                 
175
 See Jacob H. Rooksby, University Involvement in Patent Infringement 
Litigation, 47 LES NOUVELLES 8, 15 (2012), for a description of these 
arrangements and their usage. See also Ewing & Feldman, supra note 73, at 12-
15 (describing the practice of patent privateering by Intellectual Ventures); 
Steven Seidenberg, Private Profits, INSIDE COUNSEL, Mar. 2013, at 20-22 
(describing the practice of patent privateering). 
176
 Of course, the proposed statutory amendment would not forbid these 
arrangements from continuing, and universities intent on pursuing yet masking 
their involvement in speculative enforcement activity likely would continue to 
prefer these arrangements. 
177
 To this point, universities that primarily view patent licensing as a means of 
generating revenue could bargain for a higher licensing fee in exchange for 
contracting to participate as a plaintiff in any enforcement action. Thus, all 
universities with licensed patents potentially could face a choice: receive more 
licensing revenue but bear some of the risk of an enforcement lawsuit, or receive 
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Perhaps the best argument against the proposed statutory 
amendment is that it does nothing to diminish universities’ 
involvement in litigation to the extent an opposing party alleges 
that the university’s patent is invalid. After all, alleged infringers 
routinely challenge the validity of patents they are accused of 
infringing.
178
 However, arguably any university involvement in the 
litigation as a result of an invalidity contention is more likely to 
entail university inventors and perhaps university patent counsel 
than it is CROs or directors of TTOs. Contested matters of 
inventorship, prior art, and claim interpretation—the typical points 
of contention in validity inquiries—are more within their purview 
than they are that of university administrators, whose time is better 
spent promoting innovation rather than managing litigation. More 
to the point, to the extent that any of these individuals would be 
subjected to depositions or live testimony at trial, their posture 
would be more analogous to that of a defendant or expert witness 
than it would a plaintiff. For universities understandably concerned 
about the reputational risks unique to their involvement as 
plaintiffs in patent infringement lawsuits, the likelihood of 
involvement in a defensive-seeming posture would appear less 
onerous and more in line with most universities’ hesitancy to 
litigate in the first instance.
179
  
 Lastly, proposing any type of legislative action often runs 
the risk of becoming an exercise in wishful thinking, whatever the 
political climate. With respect to this Article’s proposal, detractors 
could argue that Congress never would give serious consideration 
to a proposal that might at most benefit 160 institutions in higher 
education (i.e., all those that engage in patenting), and even then 
only in a narrowly defined and relatively infrequent situation.
180
 
                                                                                                             
less licensing revenue but maintain complete freedom over whether to 
participate in any enforcement activity. A university’s decision in this realm 
would speak to its balance of mission and money through patents.   
178
 Cf. PATENT LITIGATION HANDBOOK, supra note 129, at 154 (noting that 
alleged infringers are “well advised to file counterclaims seeking declaratory 
judgment of patent noninfringement, invalidity, and/or unenforceability [. . .] 
where they apply”). 
179
 To be sure, hesitancy to litigate is not limited to universities. However, 
financial rather than reputational concerns likely account for most hesitancy 
exhibited by for-profit actors. The reputation of small- to mid-sized companies 
is unlikely to be blemished through asserting non-frivolous patent infringement 
lawsuits. In fact, such activity can enhance their reputation within industries as 
strong protectors of intellectual and financial investments. The same benefits 
also may flow to large companies, except if such companies routinely bring suits 
against smaller companies in an attempt to squelch lawful competition. 
180
 While the number of patent infringement lawsuits brought by universities, as 
well as the number of universities participating in such lawsuits, both have 
increased over time, these phenomena are negligible when viewed from the 
perspective of the total number of patent infringement lawsuits filed each year 
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However, the recent passage of the Leahy-Smith America Invents 
Act, which was driven in part by concerns over the impact on 
innovation caused by patent infringement lawsuits, as well as 
subsequent amendments to the law, gives hope that a proposal 
aimed at limiting university involvement in patent infringement 
lawsuits could find support in Congress. At the very least, 
influential groups within higher education would seem to be 
natural supporters of the proposal. The AAU—more than half of 
whose members were in the population of the study reported in this 
Article—vigorously backed the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 
as did other interested organizations such as AUTM, the 
Association of Public and Land-grant Universities, the American 
Council on Education, the Council on Governmental Relations, 
and the Association of American Medical Colleges.
181
 All of the 
aforementioned organizations, in addition to the federal 
government and important advisory groups such as the National 
Advisory Council on Innovation and Entrepreneurship and the 
National Academy of Sciences, would seem like logical supporters 




Data from the study reported in this Article suggest that 
many universities are hesitant to assert their patents through 
infringement litigation, even though CAFC interpretation of patent 
law requires their participation. Their hesitancy to sue is 
understandable, although it may only hurt their research missions 
in the long term, as suggested in Part III. Regardless of a particular 
university’s disposition toward litigating its patents, all 
universities—and particularly ones less adept at, or with fewer 
resources to devote to, technology transfer—likely would welcome 
more degrees of freedom in deciding whether to participate as 
plaintiffs in patent enforcement actions with their exclusive 
licensees. The legislative proposal introduced here could enable 
                                                                                                             
by NPEs. See Sara Jeruss, Robin Feldman & Joshua Walker, The America 
Invents Act 500: Effects of Patent Monetization Entities on US Litigation, 11 
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 357, 361 (2012) (noting that universities participated as 
plaintiffs in fewer than 1% of a sample of patent infringement lawsuits brought 
by NPEs from 2007 through 2011). 
181
 See Letter from Hunter R. Rawlings III, President, Ass’n of Am. Univs. et al. 
(June 15, 2011), available at 
www.aau.edu/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=12258 (indicating support for 
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act). 
182
 President Obama’s National Advisory Council on Innovation and 
Entrepreneurship has indicated its support for a host of proposals aimed at 
improving universities’ freedom to innovate, as has the National Academy of 
Sciences in its 2011 committee report on management of university intellectual 
property. See Letter from Mary Sue Coleman, supra note 134, at 59-82. 
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this autonomy without diminishing the mutually beneficial 
relationship between universities and exclusive licensees.  
Freed from legal coercion to participate in the most 
common type of enforcement action, universities instead could 
focus their energies and resources on doing what they do best: 
innovate. Policymakers’ recent and significant attention to the 
effects of patent law, as well as their interest in improving 
university responses to innovation and commercialization 
mandates, combine to make enacting this proposal both timely and 
feasible. At the very least, the proposed statutory amendment could 
invite an overdue dialogue on the appropriate balance between 
innovation and litigation in universities’ expanding pursuit of 
patents and commercial collaborations.  
CONCLUSION 
University enforcement of patents involves complex 
institutional decision-making in the face of increased pressures on 
universities to closely control the knowledge they are charged with 
creating and disseminating. Prior to this Article’s empirical report, 
little was known about universities that litigate patents, both in 
terms of data on enforcement actions involving universities as 
plaintiffs, as well as the policies, factors, considerations, and 
motivations that drive university decision-makers to pursue the 
activity.  
With empirical data now in hand, this Article describes the 
many legal and policy tensions that confront universities 
attempting to reconcile their admirable devotion to innovation with 
an inflexible legal regime that often compels them to litigate. The 
data provide footing for two proposals. First, from a policy 
perspective, universities must move toward a coherent position on 
patent ownership and enforcement, otherwise they are wasting 
their valuable resources seeking patents they are unwilling to 
defend categorically. Part of this transformation will require 
developing the necessary decisional infrastructures to approach the 
activity of patent enforcement in a comprehensive and prepared 
fashion. Second, from a legal perspective, university owners of 
exclusively licensed patents are hampered by a restrictive 
prudential standing doctrine that could be alleviated through 
legislative action, allowing universities the freedom to devote more 
resources to innovation and less to litigation. While the legal 
proposal has its limitations, its strengths lie in recognizing and 
plausibly alleviating the complexities and conflicts that often befall 
universities as they increasingly seek commercialization successes.  
 The research and commercialization activities of 
universities nationwide have received immense academic, 
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governmental, and popular attention in recent years. Perhaps not 
since the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act over 30 years ago have as 
many segments of society influenced by technology been so 
engaged in debating policy issues concerning patents, innovation, 
and commercialization. Universities—as significant generators of 
intellectual property and drivers of economic development—
inevitably are at the center of this dialogue, which cannot be 
separated from a larger conversation concerning the evolving 
missions, cultures, and funding models of universities amidst 
arguably the most unstable economic climate since the Great 
Depression.  
For these reasons, the time has arrived for concerted 
attention and sustained dialogue around the often-overlooked 
underbelly of university patent commercialization. If we as a 
society are serious about universities being in the business of 
innovating, we must rethink the business of their litigating.  
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APPENDIX A – SURVEY INSTRUMENT AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The survey on university patent litigation was fielded from 
August through September 2011. The survey opened on August 
22, 2011 and closed four weeks later, on September 19, 2011. 
Twenty-two completed responses were received, representing a 
36.7% completion rate. 
Chief research officers at 63 institutions (universities and 
university systems) were targeted for participation based on their 
oversight of technology transfer operations. The 63 institutions 
constitute those universities and university systems identified as 
having participated as a plaintiff in one or more patent 
infringement lawsuits filed between January 1, 1973 (the date for 
which searchable legal records are first available) and December 
31, 2010.  
The chief research officers at these 63 institutions were sent 
introductory letters on August 1, 2011, inviting their participation 
in the study. Several responded by indicating that a different 
person within their institution was better positioned to complete 
the survey, given their job duties. An email invitation to take the 
survey was sent out on August 22, 2011 to the amended list of 
participants, which totaled 60 (for unstated reasons, two members 
of the population declined to participate after receiving the 
introductory letter; an additional member was removed due to 
professed lack of knowledge about the survey’s subject matter). To 
appropriately limit responses, the email invitations contained a 
unique password-protected link to the survey, which was 
administered online using QuestionPro survey software. Responses 
were collected anonymously. Reminder emails were sent to 
participants on September 1 and September 15, 2011.  
Listed below are the aggregate survey response data. Four 
questions on the survey received more than 22 responses, as 
respondents either were permitted to select more than one response 
to the question (for questions 1 and 14) or were required to select 
three answer choices (for questions 19 and 20). Descriptive 
statistics are provided for questions with Likert-style response 
choices, which were treated as interval data. The most frequently 
selected response to each question is bolded.  
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1. What is your job title? Select all that apply. 
 
[NB: The percentages listed in the accompanying table represent 
the percentage of total respondents who selected any given answer 
choice. Because multiple selections were possible, percentages do 
not sum to 100%.]  
 
Answer Count Percent 
1. Vice President 6 27.27% 
2. Assistant or Associate Vice 
President 
2 9.09% 
3. Director of Technology 
Transfer 
10 45.45% 
4. Director of Affiliated Patent or 
Research Entity 
0 0.00% 
5. Other* 5 22.73% 
 
* Answers included Attorney, Associate Director, Chief Executive 
Officer, General Counsel, and Counsel. 
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Answer Count Percent 
1. Public 13 59.09% 
2. Private 9 40.91% 
Total 22 100% 
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3. How many times in the past year did you discuss with others 
at your university whether the university should participate as 
a plaintiff in patent infringement litigation against an infringer 




Answer Count Percent 
1. Never 7 31.82% 
2. 1-3 Times 10 45.45% 
3. 4-6 Times 3 13.64% 
4. 7-10 Times 0 0.00% 
5. >10 Times 2 9.09% 
Total 22 100% 
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4. Our university has established an affiliated patent or 
research foundation partly so that entity can participate as a 




Answer Count Percent 
1. Yes 3 13.64% 
2. No 19 83.36% 
3. I Don’t Know 0 0.00% 
Total 22 100% 
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5. Our university has a formal policy or set of guidelines to 
follow in determining whether to participate as a plaintiff in 




Answer Count Percent 
1. Yes 2 9.09% 
2. No 20 90.91% 
3. I Don’t Know 0 0.00% 
Total 22 100% 
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6. Our university sets aside money in a budget each year for 
our potential use if we decide to participate as a plaintiff in 
patent infringement litigation. 
 
 
Answer Count Percent 
1. Yes 1 4.55% 
2. No 21 95.45% 
3. I Don’t Know 0 0.00% 
Total 22 100% 
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7. Participating as a plaintiff in patent infringement litigation 
is an inevitable occurrence for our university because we own a 




Answer Count Percent 
1. Strongly Agree 5 22.73% 




4. Strongly Disagree 1 4.55% 
Total 22 100% 
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8. If appropriately conducted, participating as a plaintiff in 
patent infringement litigation is one way for our university to 




Answer Count Percent 
1. Strongly Agree 5 22.73% 




4. Strongly Disagree 0 0.00% 
Total 22 100% 
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9. Our university takes the position that if we are willing to 
invest in research and incur costs to obtain patents, we must be 




Answer Count Percent 
1. Strongly Agree 10 45.45% 




4. Strongly Disagree 0 0.00% 
Total 22 100% 
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10. Our university takes the position that participating as a 
plaintiff in patent infringement litigation is an unavoidable 





Answer Count Percent 
1. Strongly Agree 4 18.18% 
2. Somewhat Agree 12 54.55% 
3. Somewhat Disagree 5 22.73% 
4. Strongly Disagree 1 4.55% 
Total 22 100% 
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11. Participating as a plaintiff in patent infringement litigation 




Answer Count Percent 
1. Strongly Agree 1 4.55% 




4. Strongly Disagree 4 18.18% 
Total 22 100% 
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12. In considering whether the university should participate as 
a plaintiff in patent infringement litigation, the potential 
monetary returns to our university—in the form of a favorable 
verdict or out-of-court settlement—are typically highly 




Answer Count Percent 
1. Strongly Agree 7 31.82% 




4. Strongly Disagree 1 4.55% 
Total 22 100% 
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13. In considering whether the university should participate as 
a plaintiff in patent infringement litigation, the potential 
indirect costs to our university—in the form of diverted 
attention of faculty and professionals, emotional strain caused 
by the litigation, and public relations concerns—are typically 






Answer Count Percent 
1. Strongly Agree 8 36.36% 




4. Strongly Disagree 1 4.55% 
Total 22 100% 
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14. In considering whether your university should participate 
as a plaintiff in patent infringement litigation, which aspects, if 
any, of a potential defendant’s identity are most likely to weigh 
heavily in your university’s decision-making? Select all that 
apply. 
 
[NB: The percentages listed in the accompanying table represent 
the percentage of total respondents who selected any given answer 
choice. Because multiple selections were possible, percentages do 
not sum to 100%. Respondents selecting answer choice 8 or 9 were 
not permitted to select any other answer choice.]  
 
Answer Count Percent 
1. Defendant’s financial and litigation 
resources 
7 31.82% 
2. Defendant’s political influence 9 40.91% 
3. Defendant’s geographic proximity to our 
university 
3 13.64% 
4. Defendant’s prominence in the community 6 27.27% 
5. Defendant’s financial contributions to 
our university 
9 40.91% 
6. Defendant’s substantial employment of 
workers in our state 
5 22.73% 
7. Defendant’s good reputation in our 
community 
3 13.64% 
8. None of the above 3 13.64% 
9. Defendant’s identity is irrelevant to our 
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15. Which of the following statements best describes how your 
university considers legal fees in cases it contemplates bringing 
with one or more licensee(s)? 
 
[NB: Respondents were asked to assume that the likelihood of 
success in obtaining a favorable verdict or out-of-court settlement 





Answer Count Percent 
1. We are more likely to favor bringing 
suit if the licensee pays for some of our 
legal fees 
14 63.64% 
2. We are unlikely to favor bringing the suit 
unless we do not have to pay any out-of-
pocket legal fees 
6 27.27% 
3. The amount of legal fees we would have 
to pay is unlikely to influence our decision 
whether to participate in the suit 
2 9.09% 
Total 22 100% 
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16. What is the lowest range of projected monetary returns to 
your university (after accounting for legal fees and costs) over 
which your university would consider litigating? 
 
[NB: Respondents were asked to assume that the likelihood of 
success in obtaining a favorable verdict or out-of-court settlement 




Answer Count Percent 
1. $0 - $999 1 4.55% 
2. $1k - $9k 0 0.00% 
3. $10k - $49k 1 4.55% 
4. $50k - $99k 1 4.55% 
5. $100k - $249k 2 9.09% 
6. $250k - $499k 4 18.18% 
7. $500k - $999k 1 4.55% 
8. $1M - $9M 6 27.27% 
9. $10M - $49M 1 4.55% 
10. $50M - $99M 0 0.00% 
11. $100M - $249M 0 0.00% 
12. $250M - $499M 0 0.00% 
13. $500M+ 0 0.00% 
14. Monetary returns are not something our 
university considers when deciding whether 
to litigate 
5 22.73% 
Total 22 100% 
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17. What impact, if any, has your university’s past experience 
as a plaintiff in patent infringement litigation generally had on 





Answer Count Percent 
1. Past experience has made future 
participation extremely likely 
3 13.64% 
2. Past experience has made future 
participation likely 
2 9.09% 
3. Past experience has made future 
participation somewhat likely 
4 18.18% 
4. Past experience has made future 
participation NOT likely 
1 4.55% 
5. Past experience not likely to influence 
future participation 
12 54.55% 
Total 22 100% 
 
85
Rooksby: INNOVATION AND LITIGATION
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
INNOVATION AND LITIGATION: TENSIONS BETWEEN UNIVERSITIES 
AND PATENTS AND HOW TO FIX THEM 
397 
 
18. What impact, if any, has your university’s past experience 
as a defendant in patent infringement litigation generally had 
on your university’s likelihood to participate as a plaintiff in 




Answer Count Percent 
1. Past experience as defendant encouraged 
future participation as a plaintiff  
0 0.00% 
2. Past experience as defendant discouraged 
future participation as a plaintiff 
0 0.00% 
3. Past experience as defendant had no 
impact on future participation as a plaintiff 
6 27.27% 
4. Not aware of our university ever being a 
defendant in a patent infringement action 
16 72.73% 
Total 22 100% 
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19. Of the following individuals and groups, whose actual or 
anticipated opinions are most likely to weigh heavily in your 
university’s decision whether to participate as a plaintiff in a 
patent infringement lawsuit? 
 
[NB: Respondents were asked to pick the top three relevant 
choices and rank them in order of priority (1 = highest priority). 
The first table shows the count, average rank, and percentage of 
respondents selecting the various answer choices. The second 
table shows the number and percentage of respondents who 
indicated any given answer choice was their institution’s highest-
priority concern.] 
 
Answer Count Percent Avg. 
Rank 
1. The public 0 0.00% 0.00 
2. Members of our university’s 
governing board 
8 36.36% 2.25 
3. Our university’s president 10 45.45% 1.50 
4. Our university’s in-house 
attorneys 
13 59.09% 1.77 
5. Outside attorneys retained by 
our university 
12 54.55% 2.08 
6. Faculty who invented the 
patents being infringed 
9 40.91% 2.56 
7. Faculty other than those who 
invented the patents being 
infringed 
0 0.00% 0.00 
8. Licensee(s) of the patents 
being infringed 
14 63.64% 2.00 








1. The public 0 0.00% 
2. Members of our university’s 
governing board 
2 9.09% 
3. Our university’s president 5 22.73% 
4. Our university’s in-house attorneys 6 27.27% 
5. Outside attorneys retained by our 
university 
4 18.18% 
6. Faculty who invented the patents 2 9.09% 
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7. Faculty other than those who 
invented the patents being infringed 
0 0.00% 
8. Licensee(s) of the patents being 
infringed 
3 13.64% 
9. Students at our university 0 0.00% 
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20. In deciding whether to participate as a plaintiff in a patent 
infringement lawsuit, which of the following factors are most 
likely to weigh heavily in your university’s decision-making? 
 
[NB: Respondents were asked to pick the top three relevant 
choices and rank them in order of priority (1 = highest priority). 
The first table shows the count, average rank, and percentage of 
respondents selecting the various answer choices. The second 
table shows the number and percentage of respondents who 
indicated any given answer choice was their institution’s most 
important consideration.] 
 
Answer Count Percent Avg. 
Rank 
1. Belief that initiating the 
lawsuit would further the 
university’s public-serving 
mission 
7 31.82% 2.14 
2. Belief that initiating the 
lawsuit would be essential or 
important for other than revenue-
generating purposes 
5 22.73% 1.60 
3. University’s contractual 
obligation to protect the rights 
of existing licensee(s) 
15 68.18% 1.40 
4. University’s ethical obligation 
to protect the rights of existing 
licensee(s) 
6 27.27% 2.17 
5. Potential revenue generation 
through damages award 
8 36.36% 2.25 
6. Potential revenue generation 
through out-of-court settlement 
6 27.27% 3.00 
7. Likelihood that infringer will 
not pay fair license price without 
litigation threat 
5 22.73% 2.20 
8. Infringer’s disregard for 
scientific norms and standards 
0 0.00% 0.00 
9. Infringer’s disregard for 
professional norms and standards 
2 9.09% 2.50 
10. Likelihood that university 
will be viewed as a sympathetic 
litigant 
1 4.55% 3.00 
11. Groundbreaking nature of the 
infringed patent 
1 4.55% 1.00 
12. Infringer’s disregard for the 10 45.45% 1.90 
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1. Belief that initiating the lawsuit 
would further the university’s public-
serving mission 
2 9.09% 
2. Belief that initiating the lawsuit 
would be essential or important for 
other than revenue-generating 
purposes 
2 9.09% 
3. University’s contractual 
obligation to protect the rights of 
existing licensee(s) 
10 45.45% 
4. University’s ethical obligation to 
protect the rights of existing 
licensee(s) 
1 27.27% 
5. Potential revenue generation 
through damages award 
1 4.55% 
6. Potential revenue generation 
through out-of-court settlement 
0 0.00% 
7. Likelihood that infringer will not 
pay fair license price without 
litigation threat 
1 4.55% 
8. Infringer’s disregard for scientific 
norms and standards 
0 0.00% 
9. Infringer’s disregard for 
professional norms and standards 
0 0.00% 
10. Likelihood that university will be 
viewed as a sympathetic litigant 
0 0.00% 
11. Groundbreaking nature of the 
infringed patent 
1 4.55% 
12. Infringer’s disregard for the 
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APPENDIX B – ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON UNIVERSITIES IN 
DATASET 
 
Performing the research described in Subsection I.C.3. 
naturally allowed for the identification of the various universities 
that participated as plaintiffs in the located cases. Slightly more 
public universities than private ones have participated as plaintiffs 
in patent infringement litigation. Table 4 lists by funding source 
the 70 universities that were identified in my research.  
 
Table 4 
Universities That Litigate Patents,  
Listed by Institutional Funding Source 
 
Public Universities (n = 41) Private Universities (n = 29) 
Auburn University  Boston University  
Florida Atlantic University Brandeis University 
Iowa State University Brigham Young University 
Kansas State University California Institute of 
Technology 




North Carolina State University Columbia University 
North Dakota State University Cornell University 
Temple University Dartmouth College 
Texas A&M University Drexel University 
Rutgers, the State University of 
New Jersey 
Duke University 
SUNY Emory University 
University of Alabama at 
Birmingham 
Harvard University 
University of Arizona Johns Hopkins University 
University of Arkansas Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology 
University of California New York University 
University of Central Florida Northwestern University 
University of Colorado Princeton University 
University of Delaware Rensselaer Polytechnic 
Institute 
University of Florida Saint Louis University 
University of Illinois Stanford University 
University of Iowa Tufts University 
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University of Kansas Tulane University 
University of Kentucky University of Miami 
University of Maryland-College 
Park 
University of Rochester 
University of Massachusetts Vanderbilt University 
University of Michigan Wake Forest University 
University of Minnesota Washington University in St. 
Louis 
University of Missouri Yale University 
University of Nebraska  
University of New Mexico  
University of Pittsburgh  
University of South Alabama  
University of South Florida  
University of Tennessee  
University of Texas  
University of Utah  
University of Virginia  








Of the 70 institutions represented in Table 4, over half (n = 
38, or 54.3%) have participated as a plaintiff in more than one 
patent infringement lawsuit.
183
 Over 84% (n = 59) are classified 
(or, in the case of university systems, have at least one campus 
within the system classified) as doctorate-granting research 
universities with very high research activity by the Carnegie 
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.
184
 Also, many of the 
universities are elite, at least as judged by their membership in the 
                                                 
183
 Few were the universities that participated as a plaintiff in a patent 
infringement lawsuit decades ago, never to do so since then. Two such examples 
include Kansas State University and Tufts University, both of which were 
plaintiffs in lawsuits filed over 20 years ago. 
184
 The remaining 11 institutions—Auburn University, Brigham Young 
University, Catholic University, Drexel University, Florida Atlantic University, 
Kansas State University, Michigan Technological University, Saint Louis 
University, Temple University, University of South Alabama, and Wake Forest 
University—are classified as doctorate-granting research universities with high 
research activity. More information about the Carnegie system of classifications 
can be located at http://classifications.carnegiefoundation.org. 
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prestigious Association of American Universities (“AAU”).
185
 
Indeed, over half (n = 40, or 57.1%) are AAU members.  
As for relative wealth, half (n = 35, or 50.0%) of the 
universities had an approximate endowment size in 2012 of over 
$1 billion, placing them among the top 75 richest institutions in the 
United States based on this metric.
186
 Of course, the investment 
returns from these funds are unlikely to be used to fund patent 
infringement litigation. A university’s licensing revenue is a more 
probable proxy for institutional freedom to engage in patent 
infringement litigation. In that regard, and perhaps unsurprisingly, 
most universities in Table 4 generated at least $1 million in 
licensing revenue in 2011, with 26 universities (37.1%) generating 






                                                 
185
 The AAU is a nonprofit association of 59 U.S. and two Canadian 
universities. Founded in 1900, the AAU is widely considered as including some 
of the most preeminent public and private research universities in its 
membership. Membership is by invitation only. The organization frequently 
opines on policy issues in higher education, including issues involving 
intellectual property law and university commercialization.  
186
 See College and University Endowments, 2011-2012, CHRON. OF HIGHER 
EDUC. (Feb. 1, 2013), http://chronicle.com/article/CollegeUniversity/136933/. 
The remaining institutions in Table 4 are by no means without their own 
impressive endowments. Only one had an approximate endowment size of less 
than $100 million, and even that institution (Michigan Technological 
University) is among approximately the top half of all institutions whose 
endowment sizes were ranked in 2012. 
187
 See Sortable Table: Universities With the Most Licensing Revenue, FY 2011, 
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 27, 2012), 
http://chronicle.com/article/Sortable-Table-Universities/133964/. Only two 
institutions in the top 25 based on licensing revenue are not accounted for in 
Table 4. Of those two, one (Mount Sinai School of Medicine) is not a university 
as defined in this Article. See supra note 92. Four institutions in Table 4 did not 
report 2011 licensing data. They are Brandeis University, Catholic University, 
Florida Atlantic University, and Saint Louis University. While Catholic 
University never has reported data to AUTM, Brandeis, Florida Atlantic, and 
Saint Louis University have. Saint Louis University reported $2.0 million in 
licensing revenue in its last reporting year (2004); Florida Atlantic reported 
$87,950 in 2002, while Brandeis reported $631,100 in 2005. 
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